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One of the major areas for research and investment related to the Internet is the provision of quality of 
service (QoS). We remain confident that in the not-to-distance future, QoS will be introduced not only in 
private networks but in the whole Internet. QoS will bring some new features into the Internet market: (1) 
vertical product differentiation with BE and QoS, (2) usage-sensitive pricing with metering. In this 
dissertation, the equilibrium outcomes are analyzed when two rural Internet Access Providers (IAPs) 
interact with several business and technical strategies such as technology (BE or QoS), pricing scheme 
(flat-rate pricing or two-part tariff), interconnection (transit or peering) and investment in network 
capacity. To determine the equilibria, we construct a duopoly game model based on Cournot theory. We 
calibrate this model to data found in real markets. In this model, we study ten cases with a combination of 
strategic choices of two IAPs. We use two demand functions: one based on uniform distribution and the 
other based on empirical distribution which comes from the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) 
survey for Internet usage. We use a two-stage RNG (Random Number Generator) simulation and a linear 
regression for the latter. If we consider IAPs with the BE and the flat rate pricing as the current Internet, 
the equilibrium points of each case in this model suggest a progressive market equilibrium path to the 
future Internet market. Based on the equilibrium analysis of the game model, we conclude that (1) {QoS, 
two-part tariff, transit/peering} or {QoS, flat-rate pricing, peering} will be a plausible situation in the 
future Internet access market, (2) network capacity will still be an important strategy to determine market 
equilibrium in the future as well as in the current,  (3) BE will take a considerable market share in the 
QoS Internet, and (4) peering arrangements in the QoS Internet will provide a higher social welfare than 
transit. These implications from the game analysis present an analytical framework for the future Internet 
policy. 
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[CHAPTER 1] INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
After the commercialization of the Internet in 1995, the demand for various Internet services diversified; 
new real-time and business-critical data applications require improved levels of services, or ‘QoS (Quality 
of Service)’ from the network. In the current Internet, most traffic is treated indifferently; there is no 
discrimination among Internet traffic streams; there is only one class of service to which all traffic 
belongs; there is no delivery confirmation and no guarantee for timely delivery and there is a possibility 
for traffic loss. This kind of Internet service is called ‘Best Effort (BE).’ Compared to BE with no service 
classification, QoS has various classes: a class for guaranteeing timely delivery, a class for no traffic loss, 
and a class for delivery confirmation. The relationship between BE and QoS is similar to that of regular 
mail and priority mail for which users pay a higher price than regular mail. However, guaranteeing QoS 
in the Internet is not easy. The main reason is that even though Internet Service Providers (ISPs1), a 
general term of service providers in the Internet industry, are using the common TCP/IP protocol, they are 
different: different backbone capacity, different network architecture, different routing protocol, different 
business model, etc. Furthermore, there is no single entity to coordinate the whole Internet industry. 
Therefore, end-to-end QoS guarantee is impossible without stronger coordination of multiple ISPs in the 
Internet industry because any QoS assurances are only as good as the weakest link in the chain between 
sender and receiver.  
 
In the summer of 2001, large service providers like AT&T and WorldCom announced that they would 
provide Internet “Class of Service” (CoS) to their customers. The CoS consists of four classes according 
to the priority level: Platinum, Gold, Silver, and Bronze. For example, voice or video applications can get 
the highest priority, while other traffic, such as e-mail or HTTP, can be given the lowest priority, which is 
the same class as the current Internet. Table 1-1 in the next page describes the characteristic of each class. 
Since QoS interconnection policies have yet to be established, this CoS capability is limited to traffic that 
is contained completely in the provider’s own network. To address this limitation, BellSouth’s Florida 
Multimedia Internet Exchange (FMIX) announced a plan in 2001 to be the first NAP2 (Network Access 
Point) to support QoS interconnection using MPLS3. Some of the challenges (that were not in the 
                                                 
1 The term ISP in this dissertation includes IAP (Internet Access Provider) in the Internet access market and IBP 
(Internet Backbone Provider) in the Internet backbone market. See [Chapter 2] section 2.1. A company that provides 
access to the Internet. For a monthly fee, the service provider gives you a software package, username, password, 
and access phone number. Equipped with a modem, you can then log on to the Internet and browse the World Wide 
Web and Usenet, and send and receive e-mail. (source: www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/.ISP.html)  
2 A NAP is where Internet interconnection among different providers occurs. 
3 Multi-Protocol Label Switching, see [Chapter 4] section 4.2. 
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announcement) will be exactly how class matching between providers will be achieved, and how to 
disclose needed network information for an end-to-end quality guarantee without compromising the 
competitive position of the interconnecting parties.  
 
[Table 1-1] QoS Class of Service 
Type of Class Characteristics 
Platinum Real time application such as voice over IP or video conference 
Gold Business critical data communications like E-commerce 
Premium 
Class 
Silver Database applications 
BE Class Bronze Web surfing and E-mail 
     
Despite these difficulties, we remain confident that, in the not-to-distant future, QoS will be introduced 
not only in private networks but in the whole Internet. We take the backbone market leaders’ movement 
toward QoS and the emergence of QoS enabled NAP as strong signs of this shift. Other features of this 
new network include: 
(1) Product Diversification  Before QoS, there is only one available service level, i.e., BE, in which 
traffic delay and traffic dropping are possible. With QoS, there are two services in the Internet 
market: BE and QoS. Since QoS  includes BE as its lowest class of service, the new markets will 
feature vertical product differentiation.   
(2) Operational Transition  Traditionally, Internet Access Providers (IAPs4) in the U.S.  provided flat 
rate access plans, and later performed a limited amount of usage metering. Previous research 
(MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1995) indicates that, in the absence of price-based differentiation, 
users will choose the highest quality level regardless of traffic type. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect a change in pricing and billing practices toward usage-sensitive pricing with metering. 
(3) QoS Peering  The other traditional characteristic of Internet industry is peering, in which there is 
no financial payment when ISPs exchange traffic each other. However, after the 
commercialization of the Internet, peering has gradually evolved with payment. For example, a 
traffic-ratio based paid peering model is emerging; in which peering is free until traffic 
asymmetry reaches a certain ratio. At this point, peering get involved with payment. We 
anticipate the traffic ratio will be tighter in the QoS peering. 
                                                 
4 A company that provides access to the Internet  IAPs generally provide dial-up access through a modem and PPP 
connection, though companies that offer Internet access with other devices, such as cable modems or wireless 
connections, could also be considered IAPs. The term IAPs and ISPs are often used interchangeably, though some 
people consider IAPs to be a subset of ISPs. (Source: www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/IAP.html) See [Chapter 2] 
section 2.4.  
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(4) Another Balkanization  For last several years, the Internet backbone market experienced 
balkanization according to whether Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs5) have a nationwide 
backbone network or not. Another balkanization may happen based on whether ISPs have 
capability to provide QoS or not. As incumbents with a national backbone network exercise their 
market power in negotiating with smaller ISPs and new entrants, ISPs armed with QoS capability 
may discriminate based on their QoS capability. 
 
The QoS Internet with these new features lets IAPs have several options for their strategies besides 
network capacity. New strategies are chosen for their profit maximization, which is dependent on not only 
my own strategies but also the other’s strategies. With the QoS Internet scenario, we build an Internet 
QoS Game model through which we show IAPs market equilibrium behaviors. The Internet QoS game 
analysis will give us answers to several questions, i.e., which is a dominant strategy set in the future 
Internet market, what is a progressive path of IAP’s market behaviors, or do new strategies give us a 
higher social welfare?  
 
1.2 Overview of Internet QoS Game Model 
ISPs are competitors and cooperators simultaneously: competitors for market share and cooperators for 
global connectivity. One ISP’s decision has an influence on other ISP’s decisions. Thus, they have a 
strong dependence on each beyond just competitive factors. These characteristics make the Internet 
provision industry suitable for game theoretic analysis, i.e., each player in the game model is a competitor 
in a market and there are interactions according to their strategic variables. 
 
In this dissertation, we apply Cournot duopoly theory to our game model, describing two IAPs in a rural 
area. In Cournot duopoly game model, firms’ output level is a strategic variable and its main assumptions 
are product homogeneity and no entry: there are two firms in the market and each firm produces identical 
product and the market quantity of two firms determines the market price. In the game model of this 
dissertation, we use the same assumptions and make an extended duopoly game model, which will be 
applied to the Internet access market.  Each IAP has four strategic choices: technology (BE or QoS), 
pricing scheme (flat-rate pricing or two-part tariff), investment in network capacity (1K, 2K, or 3K6), and 
                                                 
5 A backbone provider supplies access to high-speed transmission lines that connect users to the Internet. These lines 
comprise the backbone of the Internet. An IBP supplies the ISPs with access to the lines sch as T1 or T3 lines, that 
connect ISPs to each other. (Source: www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/backbone_provider.html). See [Chapter 2] 
section 2.3 
6 “K” means 1,000. For example 1K (2K, 3K) means an IAP can support up to 999 (1999, 2999) users. Because we 
assume 5,000 potential users in the market, network capacity for 3,999 or 4,999 users means negative profit to the 
IAPs. 
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interconnection method (peering or transit). While these four choices are assumed to be long-term 
strategies, which can not be varied in a short term period, output level is supposed to be a short-term 
strategy which can be varied within a chosen network capacity. Table 1-2 presents an overall game 
structure. There are ten unique cases considering interconnection, pricing, and technology strategies. 
Because of symmetric characteristic, there are duplicates of Cases 2, 3, 4, and 8. Peering is only possible 
for two IAPs with the same technology.  
 
[Table 1-2] Internet QoS Game Model 
Transit Peering 
BE QoS BE QoS 
                                            IAP2 
 
IAP1 Flat Flat 2-Part Flat Flat 2-Part 
BE Flat Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Flat Case 2 Case 5 Case 4 
 
Transit QoS 
 2-Part Case 3 Case 4 Case 6 
 
BE Flat Case 7  
Flat Case 9 Case 8 
 
Peering QoS 
2-Part 
 
 
Case 8 Case10 
 
[Table 1-3] Internet QoS Game Model in Detail 
Transit Peering 
BE QoS BE QoS 
Flat Flat Two-Part Flat Flat Two-Part 
 
 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1          
2          
 
BE 
 
Flat 
3          
1          
2          
 
Flat 
3          
1          
2          
 
 
 
Transit  
 
QoS 
 
2-Part 
3          
 
1    
2    
 
BE 
 
Flat 
3    
 
1       
2       
 
Flat 
3       
1       
2       
 
 
 
Peering  
 
QoS 
 
2-Part 
3 
 
 
      
 
Table 1-3 shows the model structure in detail including investment in network capacity. Every case has 
nine cells (3x3), which are characterized by its network capacity (1K, 2K, or 3K). There are a total of 90 
cells in this model (= 9 cells * 10 cases). In each cell, both IAPs try to maximize their profit by choosing 
an optimal output level, which is determined by interactions between them through the strategic variables.  
 
Case10 
Case9 Case8 
Case7 
Case1 Case2 Case3 
Case4 Case5 
Case6 
 5 
The following two game trees are equivalent to the above two tables. A game tree is a diagram  
composed of nodes and branches. Each node in the game tree represents a decision point for one of the 
players; each branch represents a possible action for a player at that point in the game. (Bierman and 
Fernandez, 1993, p71) Because this game is a simultaneous game, it makes no difference whoever makes 
the first move, i.e., IAP1 and IAP2 are interchangeable. This game is processed with two steps: in the first 
step (figure 1-1), each IAP determines its strategies such as technology, pricing scheme, and 
interconnection. The game is divided into ten cases by which of these three choices are made. In the 
second step (figure 1-2), IAP1 and IAP2 in every ten cases have three investment options in their network 
capacity. After they set all their strategies, they optimize their profit (f1* and f2*) simultaneously with 
their output level, i.e., (q1BE, q1QoS) and (q2BE, q2QoS)7.  By using the technique of backward induction8, 
we can find an optimal investment strategy for each case and an optimal strategy set of the whole Internet 
QoS game model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1-1] Internet QoS Game Tree 
                                                 
7 Output is defined in the model as a number of users of BE and QoS, i.e., q1BE / q1QoS is a number of BE / QoS 
users subscribed to the IAP1.    
8 This idea is to begin with each of the final nodes in the game tree and determine the optimal decision to make at 
each of these points. For example, at first, find the maximum f2* of each node of IAP2 and then find the maximum 
f1* at the node of IAP1 in the above game model. 
IAP1
IAP2
IAP2
IAP2
BE, Flat, Transit 
QoS, Flat, Transit 
QoS, 2Part, Transit 
BE, Flat, Peering 
QoS, Flat, Peering 
QoS, 2Part, Peering 
IAP2
IAP2
IAP2
BE, Flat, Transit 
BE, Flat, Transit 
BE, Flat, Transit 
QoS, Flat, Transit
QoS, Flat, Transit 
QoS, Flat, Transit 
QoS, 2Part, Transit 
QoS, 2Part, Transit 
QoS, 2Part, Transit 
BE, Flat, Peering 
QoS, Flat, Peering 
QoS, Flat, Peering 
QoS, 2Part, Peering 
QoS, 2Part, Peering 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Case 2 
Case 5 
Case 4 
Case 3 
Case 4 
Case 6 
Case 7 
Case 8 
Case 8 
Case 9 
Case 10 
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[Figure 1-2] Game Tree of Each Case 
 
Case 1 can be considered as the current Internet model and Cases 4~6 and Cases 8~10, can be interpreted 
by the future Internet models. The others (Cases 2, 3, and 7) may be viewed as the Internet in transition 
between the current and future. By analyzing the market equilibrium of current and future Internet, we 
suggest a progressive path of Internet market equilibrium. In addition, we can calculate social welfare at 
the equilibrium points of each cell and find whose social welfare is higher.  
 
1.3 Research Purpose 
The main assumption in this model is that the Internet access market is a duopoly; this is reasonable for 
many rural areas in the U.S. In reality, there are many IAPs in the access market, most of which are 
concentrated in urban metropolitan areas. Some of them are large companies with financial power and a 
high level of technology, but many of them are small-sized, family-operated, rural IAPs. From the 
universal connectivity point of view the small rural IAPs are very important in providing Internet 
accessibility to the whole nation. The Telecommunication Act of 1996 expressed that the universal 
service should be achieved through reducing an information gap between urban and rural areas. However, 
asymmetric investment in the network infrastructure makes a clear digital divide between the rural and 
urban areas. According to the 2001 annual ISP survey9, 80% of IAPs are classified as relatively small 
firms. Our model in this dissertation focuses on small IAPs in a rural area. The research purpose of this 
study is to provide a foundation of policy framework for the QoS connectivity in the future Internet 
access market. Furthermore, some of the results may also provide guidance for other markets in this 
industry as well.  
                                                 
9 The 13th edition of the Directory of Internet Service Providers, Boardwatch magazine  
(www.ispworld.com/isp/introduction.htm) 
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1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In today’s dynamic Internet environment, we study how the market behavior of IAPs will be changed in 
the QoS Internet market. Every IAP has a different set of business and technical strategies: (1) It could 
choose peering (no financial settlement) or transit (with financial settlement) as interconnection strategies 
according to its coverage area and its network size; (2) it could choose a pricing strategy flat-rate or 
usage-sensitive; (3) it could determine its network capacity according to its investment strategy; and (4) it 
could choose BE or QoS as its technology. All choices would be determined by the interaction with other 
IAPs in the market. 
 
Based upon the above strategic choices, there are several specific research questions in this dissertation.  
(1) What is the market equilibrium behavior of BE-IAPs with a strategy of network capacity? 
(2) What is the market equilibrium behavior of QoS-IAPs with different strategies such as capacity 
planning, output level, and pricing scheme? 
(3) What is the market equilibrium behavior between BE-IAP and QoS-IAP with different strategies 
such as capacity planning and pricing scheme? 
(4) What are social welfare values at market equilibrium points of each case and which one is 
socially desirable? 
(5) Is an IAP with usage-sensitive pricing generally profitable than an IAP with flat-rate pricing? 
 
Based upon the above research questions and the game model, we try to test the following five 
hypotheses: 
  
(H1) An IAP with BE technology has the same profit in market equilibrium as another IAP with the 
same technology. 
(H2) An IAP with QoS technology and usage sensitive QoS pricing has a higher profit in market 
equilibrium than an IAP with QoS technology and flat-rate QoS pricing.  
(H3) An IAP with BE technology and flat-rate pricing has a lower profit in market equilibrium than 
an IAP with QoS technology and flat-rate QoS pricing. 
(H4) An IAP with QoS technology with usage-sensitive QoS pricing has a higher profit in market 
equilibrium than an IAP with BE technology and flat-rate pricing.   
(H5) Both IAPs with QoS technology give a higher social welfare than any other cases. 
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1.5 Research Method 
In this dissertation, we make two different assumptions of data distribution for users’ willingness-to-pay: 
(1) uniform distribution and (2) empirical distribution. According to the different assumptions, we use 
different demand functions. For the demand function of empirical distribution we conduct a two-stage 
RNG (Random Number Generator) simulation, which will be described in detail in the section 7.1. 
 
Based on the above demand functions and a cost function made by the data10 found in the real market, we 
establish a profit function. Then, we try to find an equilibrium point when both IAPs maximize their 
profits simultaneously. We use three kinds of softwares to solve this model: (1) CSIM (simulation 
library), (2) SPSS (statistical package), and (3) Mathematica (math problem-solving package). Figure 1-1 
shows an overall research process: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1-3] Research Procedure 
 
                                                 
10 Most data in this dissertation are based on the year 2001. 
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[CHAPTER 2] INTERNET INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Internet is a system that makes it possible to send and receive information among all the individual 
and institutional computers associated with it. The Internet industry integrates the equipment, software, 
and organizational infrastructure required for Internet communications. As a rough approximation it can 
be said ISPs in the Internet industry are classified into two categories: IBPs that transfer communications 
in bulk among network exchange points, and IAPs that (1) receive communications from individuals or 
institutions and transfer them to an IBP’s network, and (2) receive communications from IBPs and 
transfer them to their destination. Generally speaking, the Internet industry has a vertical structure: 
Upstream IBPs provide an intermediate good and downstream IAPs use this input to sell connectivity to 
their customers. Therefore, the relationship between IBPs and IAPs is that of wholesalers and retailers. 
 
In reality the Internet is much more complex. The IAPs themselves are networks of users that may 
directly exchange information among each other. In addition, the IBPs11 may provide services directly to 
users and also may interconnect with other IBPs. In this sense, the Internet is a network of networks that 
is accessible in many parts of the world. Since the telephone industry is tightly intertwined with the 
Internet industry, we begin by with an examination of it.   
 
2.2 Telephone Industry 
The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) was designed and optimized for the transmission of 
human voice. In the U.S., telephone service is divided into two industries: (1) local telephone service 
provided by Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and (2) long distance telephone service provided by 
Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). This structure creates a vertical hierarchy: The upstream IXCs provide the 
connection between LECs, and the downstream LECs have direct access to telephone users. 
 
Traditionally, a LEC was a monopoly that served a specific geographic region without competition. Even 
after deregulation, LECs are still considered by many to be a local monopoly, especially for residential 
customers. In the U.S., the local telephone services provided under flat-rate billing, that is, a telephone 
user can originate local calls as many times and as long as he wishes with only monthly flat rate. This 
type of billing system has been a great influence on the growth of Internet access market.  
 
                                                 
11 IBPs like AT&T WorldNet, Broadwing, CAIS, Epoch, Netaxs, Savvis Communications, XO also support dial-up 
access customers in the downstream market. (http://www.boardwatch.com/isp/bb/n_america.htm) 
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The long distance market is now generally considered to be a very competitive market, though it too was 
a monopoly at one time. Users can use a long distance calling with a pre-selected IXC through their LEC. 
Any IXC that wishes to handle calls originating in a local service area can build a switching office, called 
a Point of Presence (POP), there. The function of the POP is to interconnect networks so that now any site 
where networks interconnect may be referred to as a POP.  
 
2.3 Internet Backbone Providers 
With some simplification, it can be said that the IBPs receive communications in bulk from POPs or 
NAPs and distribute them to other POPs or NAPs close to the destination. NAPs are public 
interconnection points where major providers interconnect their network and consist of a high-speed 
switch or network of switches to which a number of routers can be connected for the purpose of traffic 
exchange. The NAPs are similar to major airport hubs; all IAPs and IBPs are gathered at the NAPs to 
connect each other.  
 
Before the Internet privatization, the NSF (National Science Foundation) was responsible for the 
operation of the Internet. The NSF backbone ceased operation in late 1994 and was replaced by the four 
NAPs12 (Minoli, 1998, pp27-28). There are probable around 50 major NAPs13 world-wide in the Internet, 
most of which are located in the U.S. (Moulton, 2001, p551). As the Internet continued to grow, the 
NAPs suffered from congestion because of the enormous traffic loads. Because of the resulting poor 
performance, private direct interconnections between big IBPs were introduced, called private peering, 
which will be explained in detail in the section 3.2.   
 
To make the Internet a seamless network, the IBPs have multiple POPs distributed over the whole world. 
Most frequently they are located in large urban centers. These POPs are connected each other with owned 
or leased optical carrier lines. Typically, these lines are 622 Mbps (OC-12) or 2.488 Gbps (OC-48) 
circuits or more, as defined by the SONET14 hierarchy. These POPs and optical carrier lines make up the 
IBP backbone network. The IBP’s POPs, are also connected with the POPs of many IAPs. The 
relationship between an IAP’s POP and IBP’s POP is the same as that of IAPs and IBPs. 
 
                                                 
12 Four NAPs are Chicago NAP (Ameritech), San Francisco NAP (Pacific Bell), New York NAP (Sprint), and 
Washington D.C. NAP (Metropolitan Fiber Systems). 
13 Sometimes NAPs are known by names such as Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), Federal Internet Exchange 
(FIX), and Metropolitan Area Exchange (MAE). 
14 SONET stands for Synchronous Optical Networking. The capacity of OCx is based on that of OC1 (51.84 Mbps). 
For example, the capacity of OC3 is 3 times of OC1. (155.52 Mbps = 3*51.84 Mbps)   
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According to Erickson (2001), the North American backbone market had around 36 IBPs15 in the first 
quarter of 2001. However, these numbers misinterpret the Internet backbone market structure because this 
market is highly concentrated.  There were 11,888 interconnections between backbone and access 
markets in April 2000. (McCarthy, 2000)  Counting by the number of connections to downstream market, 
MCI/Worldcom is a dominant player in the backbone market with 3,145 connections and Sprint is the 
second largest backbone provider with 1,690 connections and AT&T (934 connections) and C&W (851 
connections) are the third and the fourth.  
 
Several of the large IBPs are subsidiaries of large telephone companies such as AT&T, MCI/WorldCom, 
Sprint, etc. Since these companies own the infrastructure needed for telephone services, they are very 
favorably positioned to provide the facilities and equipment required by the IBPs. In addition, due to their 
size, they are able to offer large volume discount rates or bundling agreements of both telephone and 
Internet lines for the services they provide. This is possible because the Internet industry is lightly 
regulated, if at all. In particular, there are no regulations with respect to the tariffs that can be charged for 
the services provided. From these observations it follows that the large IBPs, supported by the large 
telephone companies, are in a position to capture large shares of the upstream market. 
 
According to Carlton and Perloff (1999, p247), the most common measure of concentration in an industry 
is their share of sales by the four largest firms, called a C4 ratio. Generally speaking, if the C4 ratio is 
over 60, the market is considered a tight oligopoly. For the upstream backbone market this ratio16 is 73, 
which shows high concentration in the market. The entry barrier is also high because there is a large sunk 
cost for nationwide backbone lines and switching equipment. The number of IBPs for the past three years 
shows just how high the entry barrier in the backbone market is: 43 (1999), 41(2000), and 36 (2001)17. 
The slight reduction for last three years is caused by mergers and acquisitions (M&A)18 and 
reclassification19.  According to the number of players, we conclude that the overall backbone market is 
stable. In addition there are significant economies of scale and the rapid pace of technological change 
generates a large amount of uncertainty about the future return on investments. It is not easy to enter this 
market without large investments and high technology. 
 
                                                 
15 These numbers are based on North America region. 
16 Source: TeleGeography, Inc. The calculation is based on the data of 1999 U.S. backbone revenue (Worldcom 
38%, Genuity 15%, AT&T 11%, Sprint 9%) 
17 The Boardwatch magazine’s annual survey for ISPs. 
18 AOL and Time Warner, GTE and Bell Atlantic, Concentric and NextLink, Qwest and US West, etc 
19 The backbone section was divided into backbone provider and data center provider from 2001 survey. 
 12 
The interconnection price is usually determined by the provider’s relative strength and level of investment 
in a particular area (Halabi, 2000, 42p). It is certain that the T1 Internet interconnection price has been 
decreased continuously in recent years. In 1996, the Internet connectivity for T1 was $3,000 per month 
with $1,000 setup fee (Halabi, 1997, 40p). According to Martin (2001), the average price of a T1 
connection in 1999 was $1,729. In 2000, it was $1,348. In 2001, it was $1,228. One of reasons for the 
decreasing T1 interconnection price is advent of substitute services for T1 line, such as wireless Internet 
access technology20, digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, and cable-modem technology, which exert 
a downward pressure on T1 prices. 
 
2.4 Internet Access Providers 
An IAP’s service is public access to the Internet, which includes login authorization, e-mail services, 
some storage space, and possibly personal web pages. The following diagram illustrates the components 
of dial-up IAP and its environment. The DS-0 line (Digital Signal level 0)21 is a normal telephone local 
loop. The T122 line between CO (Central Office) and IAP’s modem pool is dedicated line for the IAP’s 
customer traffic from a particular CO to their data center. Another T1 line is needed to connect to the 
Internet, which runs from the IAP’s router to the IBP’s POP.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 2-1] ISP Business Environment 
 
The IAP’s coverage area is usually determined by the existence of an IAP’s POP within the local 
telephone area. IAPs are classified as local, regional, and national according to the scope of their service 
coverage. The distribution of IAPs is presented in table 2-1.  
                                                 
20 LMDS (Local Multiple Distribution System) and satellite based Internet service 
21 DS0 is a basic digital signal converted from analog voice (64 Kbps).  
22 T1 line has 1.544 Mbps capacity, which is the same as 24 DS0 (64Kbps) telephone lines. 
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Among 307 telephone area codes in U.S., the largest IAP covers 282 area codes and the smallest covers 
only 1 area code. The IAPs with 1 to 10 area codes constitute 79.81% of the total number of IAPs. Thus, 
most IAPs in the downstream market are small, local companies. Some of these small IAPs are 
subsidiaries or affiliates of CLECs (Competitive Local Exchange Carriers), which are telephone 
companies established in the 1990s as a result of telephone industry deregulation.  
 
[Table 2-1] Distribution of IAPs by Coverage 
Telephone area codes covered by IAP Percentage Type 
1 35.14% Local 
2-10 44.67% Local / Regional 
11-24 4.11% Regional 
25-282 16.08% National 
• Source: The 13th edition of the Directory of Internet Service Providers, Boardwatch magazine 
(www.ispworld.com/isp/introduction.htm)23 
 
AOL-Time Warner is a dominant player in the dial-up access market. According to Fusco (2001), AOL-
Time Warner had 22.7 million subscribers in the 1st quarter of 2001. Table 2-2 shows the top 10 dial-up 
IAPs ranked by the number of paying users.  
 
[Table 2-2] Top 10 U.S. Fee-Based IAPs (Dial-up only)24 
Rank & ISP Paying 
User 
Market 
Share 
Rank & ISP Paying 
User 
Market 
Share 
(1) AOL 22.7M 46% (6)Gateway.net 1.7M 3% 
(2) MSN 5.0M 10% (7)AT&T WorldNet 1.3M 3% 
(3)EarthLink 4.8M 10% (8)NetZero+Juno Online 1.0M 2% 
(4) Prodigy 3.1M 6% (9) Verizon 0.9M 2% 
(5)CompuServe 3.0M 6% (10) Bell South 0.8M 2% 
• Source: www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html 
 
In the downstream access market the C4 ratio25 is 72, which is also highly concentrated. However, the 
entry barrier in the downstream market is much lower than in the backbone market. Since subscribers can 
utilize the PSTN line to connect IAPs’ modems, IAPs do not have to invest in access lines to individual 
subscribers. They can build POPs to link to the PSTN and other IAPs or IBPs. Since T1 lines prices and 
telecom equipment prices are currently dropping quickly, a large number of small IAPs are possible, 
                                                 
23 Total number of registered IAPs to this survey is 7,288 at March, 2001  
24 Total number of customers of paid dial-up IAPs is 49.6 M at the first quarter of 2001 according to the 
Telecommunications Report International Inc. We calculated market share of each companies. The rest of IAPs’ 
market share except top 10 IAPs is expected as 11%. 
25 Source: www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html 
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especially in the less densely populated areas. The number of North American IAPs for the past several 
years is an evidence of low entry barrier in the downstream market: 1447 (February 1996), 3640 
(February 1997), 4470 (February 1998), 5078 (March 1999), 7463 (April 2000), and 7288 (March 
2001)26.  
 
In summary, considering the market concentration and the entry barriers, IBPs have more market power 
than IAPs in the Internet industry. Table 2-3 compares the IBP and IAP markets presented above. 
 
[Table 2-3] Comparison of Access and Backbone Markets 
 No. of companies Dominant Company C4 Entry Barrier 
Backbone Market 36 MCI/WorldCom (UUNET27) 73 Higher 
Access Market 7,228 AOL TimeWarner 72 Lower 
• Sources: TeleGeography, Inc., Internet.com Magazine, and Boardwatch Magazine 
 
Most IAPs provide unlimited Internet access with a monthly flat rate. For the major national IAPs, the 
price ranges generally from $0 to $25 per month28. Some IAPs provide Internet access service with zero 
monthly subscription fees to their customers29; their revenues depend completely on Internet advertising 
income. According to Zigmont (2000), cost of startup IAP is roughly $12 per subscriber including $7 for 
management/maintenance cost plus $5 for marketing.  
 
2.5 Relationship between Telephone Industry and Internet Industry 
Dial-up access using PSTN is the most universal form of Internet access. In the U.S., such a modem call 
is typically a local call without a per-minute charge. IAP’s lines are treated as a business telephone user 
not as a carrier, so they are not required to pay the measured Common Carrier Line Charge (CCLC)30. 
The switching system in the LEC’s CO connects calls between Internet users and IAP’s modem pool so 
the LECs’ facilities support dial-up Internet communications. In addition, IBPs and large IAPs often 
construct their backbone networks by leasing lines from IXCs and LECs. As a result, we can say that 
telephone industry provide basic infrastructure for the Internet industry.  
 
                                                 
26 Source: www.ispworld.com/isp/images/NA_ISPs_chart.gif. At the time of July 2001, the number of ISPs is over 
8,000. 
27 UUNET is a subsidiary of the MCI/WorldCom 
28 Telecommunications International Inc.’s Quarterly Online Census at March 31, 2000  
29 AltaVista, FreeInternet.com, NetZero, FreeLane, Source: www.ispworld.com/introduction.htm. 
30 LECs have traditionally been charging IXCs $.03/minute at each end for originating and terminating calls. This 
CCLC recovers part of the cost of the local loop. 
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The following diagram explains the overall Internet connections from end user to LEC’s CO, IAP, IBP, 
and NAP. In this diagram, the local IAP’s POP connected to AT&T POP is located in the LEC’s CO. The 
AT&T and Sprint POPs are connected two ways: (1) through the public NAP and (2) through a private 
peering line. We will explain in detail peering concept in the next chapter. 
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[Figure 2-2] Relationship among CO, POPs, and NAP 
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[CHAPTER 3] INTERNET INTERCONNECTION STRATEGIES: PEERING VS. 
TRANSIT 
In this chapter, we will examine peering and transit as an interconnection strategy, which determines a 
part of an IAP’s cost. The main difference between peering and transit is in the financial rights and 
obligation that they generate to their customers. 
 
3.1 History of Internet Interconnection 
To understand the relationship between peering and transit, it is necessary to recall the non-commercial 
origin of the Internet. During the Internet’s early development, there was only one backbone and only one 
customer, the military, so interconnection was not an issue. In the 1980s, as the Internet was opened to 
academic and research institutions, the National Science Foundation (NSF) funded the NSFNET as an 
Internet backbone. Around that time, the Federal Internet Exchange (FIX) served as a first point of 
interconnection between federal and academic networks. At the time that commercial networks began 
appearing, general commercial activity on the Internet was restricted by Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), 
which prevented the commercial networks from exchanging traffic with one another using the NSFNET 
as the backbone. (Kende, 2000) In the early 1990s, a number of commercial backbone operators including 
PSINet, UUNET, and CerfNET established the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) for the purpose of 
interconnecting theses backbones and exchanging their end users’ traffic. The NSF decided to cease to 
operate the NSF backbone, which was replaced by four NAPs. (Minoli and Schmidt, 1998, p28) The role 
of NAPs is similar to that of CIX. The NSF required that any ISP receiving government contracts or 
receiving money from public universities must connect to all of the NAPs. After the advent of CIX and 
NAPs, commercial backbones developed a system of interconnection known as peering.  
 
There are 150 Internet exchange points (IXPs) in the worldwide31 irrespective of size and most of them 
are located at U.S.  Companies will run public IXPs of various names such as NAP, MAE, and CIX as a 
service to the industry (Greene, 2000). Those companies price the service so they do not lose money.  
Their core revenues from running the IXP are gained from (1) infrastructure sold into the IXP, i.e. leased 
line, and (2) co-location business. 
 
                                                 
31 Source: http://www.telegeography.com 
 17 
3.2 Peering 
The term “peering” is sometimes used generically to refer to Internet interconnection with no financial 
settlement32, which is known as a “Sender Keeps All (SKA)” or “Bill and Keep.” Peering can be divided 
into several categories: (1) according to its openness, it can be private peering or public peering, (2) 
according to the numbers of peering partners it can be Bilateral Peering Arrangement (BLPA) or 
Multilateral Peering Arrangement (MLPA), and (3) according to the market in which it occurs, it can be 
primary peering in the backbone market or secondary peering in the downstream market.  
 
The original four NAPs were points for public peering. As the Internet traffic grew, the NAPs suffered 
from congestion. Therefore, direct circuit interconnection between two large IBPs was introduced, so 
called bilateral private peering, which takes place at a mutually agreed place of interconnection. This 
private peering is opposed to public peering that takes place at the NAPs. It is estimated that 80 percent of 
Internet traffic is exchanged via private peering (Kende, 2000).  
 
A peering arrangement is based on equality, that is, ISPs of equal size would peer. The measures of size 
could be  (i) geographic coverage, (ii) network capacity, (iii) traffic volume, (iv) size of customer base, or 
(v) a position in the market. The ISPs would peer when they perceive equal benefit from peering based on 
their own subjective terms. (Kende, 2000) 
 
The followings are the characteristics of peering: 
(1) Peering partners only exchange traffic that originates with the customer of one ISP and terminates 
with the customer of the other peered ISP. As part of peering arrangement, an ISP would not act 
as an intermediary. And it would not accept the traffic of one peering partner for the purpose of 
transiting this traffic to another peering partner. This characteristic is called a “non-transitive 
relationship.” 
(2) Peering partners exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis. The only cost of each partner is its 
own equipment and the transmission capacity needed for the two peers to meet at each peering 
point 
(3) Peering partners generally meet in a number of geographically dispersed locations. In order to 
decide where to pass traffic to another, they have adopted what is known as “hot-potato routing,” 
where an ISP will pass traffic to another backbone at the earliest point of exchange.  
 
                                                 
32 Settlment can be thought of as payments or financial transfers between ISPs in return for interconnection and 
interoperability (Cawley, 1997) 
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According to Block (Cukier, 1999), there are two conditions necessary for the SKA peering, that is, 
peering with no settlement, to be viable: (1) The traffic flows should be roughly balanced between 
interconnecting networks; and (2) the cost of terminating traffic should be low in relation to the cost of 
measuring and billing for traffic. In sum, peering is sustainable under the assumption of mutual benefits 
and avoidance of costly, unnecessary traffic measuring. Peering partners would make a peering 
arrangement if they each perceive that they have more benefits than costs from the peering arrangement. 
Most ISPs in the U.S. historically have not metered traffic flows and accordingly have not erected a 
pricing mechanism based on usage. Unlimited access with a flat rate is a general form of pricing structure 
in the Internet industry. Finally, peering makes billing simple: no metering and no financial settlement.  
 
Peering benefits come mainly from the network externality. Network externalities arise when the value or 
utility that a customer derives from a product or service increases as a function of other customers of the 
same or compatible products or services; that is, the more users there are, the more valuable the network 
is. There are two kinds of network externality in the Internet. One is direct network externality: the more 
E-mail users, the more valuable the Internet is. The other is indirect network externality: the more Internet 
users there are, the more web contents will be developed, which makes the Internet even more valuable 
for its users. The ability to provide direct and indirect network externalities to customers provides an 
almost overpowering incentive for ISPs to cooperate with one another by interconnecting their networks.  
(Kende, 2000) Another motivation for peering is lower latency because peering needs only one hop to 
exchange traffic between peering partners. 
 
3.3 Transit 
Transit is an alternative arrangement between ISPs, in which one pays another to deliver traffic between 
its customers and the customers of other provider. The relationship of transit arrangement is hierarchical: 
a provider-customer relationship. Unlike a peering relationship, a transit provider will route traffic from 
the transit customer to its peering partners. An IBP with many transit customers has a better position 
when negotiating a peering arrangement with other IBPs. Another difference between peering and transit 
is existence of a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which describes outage and service objectives, and the 
financial repercussion for failure to perform. In a peering arrangement, there is no SLA to guarantee rapid 
resolution of problems. In case of an outage, both peering partners may try to resolve the problem, but it 
is not mandatory. This is one of the reasons peering agreements with a company short on competent 
technical staff are broken.  In a transit arrangement it is a contract and customers could ask the transit 
provider to meet the SLA. Many e-commerce companies prefer transit to peering for this reason. Since 
one minute of outage causes lots of losses to them, rapid recovery is critical to their business. 
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Furthermore, in the case of transit, there is no threat to quit the relationship while in the case of peering a 
non-renewal of the peering agreement is a threat. ISPs are not permitted to form transit relationship over 
public NAPs because these are designed as a neutral meeting place for peering. There is one exception: 
bypassing the public NAP switching fabric and running a backdoor serial connection between them. 
 
3.4 Internet Interconnection Issue - Depeering 
In 1996, AGIS33 was the first IBP to unilaterally terminate peering arrangements. After that, a series of 
IBPs announced that they were ending peering with many of their previous peering partners and were no 
longer accepting peering arrangements from other networks whose infrastructure would not allow the 
exchange of a similar traffic level. Instead of peering, they would charge those smaller ISPs for transit. 
Finally, the large IBPs moved away from public NAPs to a series of private peering or maintained 
relatively small capacities like T3 in the NAPs and then placed themselves in a new hierarchy, so called 
top-tier IBPs (Jew and Nicolls, 1999). Most top-tier IBPs are subsidiaries or affiliates of the major 
facilities-based telecommunication carriers.  They are UUNET (Worldcom), C&W, Genuity, AT&T 
WorldNet, and Sprint, the ‘so called’ Big 5. They don’t need transit service from others and they make 
peering arrangement with each other. Over 80% US backbone traffic is estimated to pass through their 
backbones (Weinberg, 2000). The other IBPs make peering arrangements among themselves and 
simultaneously purchase transit services from the Big 5. 
 
There are two types of cases for which peering is generally refused: (1) Regional IBPs which do not have 
a national backbone network and (2) content providers or web hosting companies, so called the web 
farms. The main reason for this refusal is a free-rider issue. Under the hot-potato routing rule (shortest 
exit routing), someone who does not have a national backbone network must transport its traffic on the 
others’ backbone networks. In addition to that, asymmetric traffic patterns, which occur in file transfer or 
web surfing, result in increased capacity costs without commensurate revenues.  
 
Some of the Big 5 recently disclosed their policy for peering but some of them still do not. There is a kind 
of unwritten rule shared by the Big 5 about their peering standard: (i) A coast to coast national backbone 
with a certain level of bandwidth requirement, (ii) a number of presences in the major exchange points, 
(iii) 7 days by 24 hours Network Operation Center (NOC) and highly experienced technical staffs, and 
(iv) a certain level of traffic ratio between inbound and outbound, usually 1:4. We can not tell what the 
exact requirements for the private peering are since peering agreements are under non-disclosure. Without 
                                                 
33 On May 19, 2000, Telia International Inc., substantially purchased all the operating assets of AGIS. 
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doubt, these requirements could be a significant entry barrier for a new entrant. In Appendix A, peering 
policies of UUNET and C&W are summarized.   
 
PSINet, which was one of the large IBPs, used a peering standard called “open peering policy”, that was 
different from others. It would peer with any ISP including local, regional, and national except for 
companies whose primary business was web hosting or content collection. Some of the Big 5 did not 
want to peer with PSINet, because some of PSINet’s private peering partners are transit customers of the 
Big 5. Whenever the Big 5 upgrade their networks, they upgrade their peering policy. From the tier-2 
IBP’s point of view, peering requirements are getting tougher and tougher. Nobody can enter into the top 
tier group without their approvals. This kind of cartel-like behavior has been an important issue in the 
Internet industry for several years. 
 
After being refused peering in the backbone market, IAPs in the downstream access market, usually 
operating in a limited geographic region, tried to peer among themselves. Cremer and Tirole (2000) in 
their paper call this kind of peering “local secondary peering.” This is a major factor in proliferation of 
local and regional Internet exchange points. These smaller exchange points (compared to NAPs) referred 
to as Metropolitan Exchange Points (MXPs) (OECD, 1998). 
 
Most of Internet exchange points, or POPs of major IBPs are located near the metropolitan areas, which 
are far from the rural areas. The local IAPs in a rural area have to lease long expensive lines to reach an 
interconnection point. This long distance from private or public peering points is additional obstacle to 
overcome for the rural IAPs.  
 
The Pittsburgh Internet Exchange (PITX34) is an example of local peering arrangement. Without this local 
peering, all network traffic passing from one Pittsburgh network to another has to be sent through 
Washington, D.C., Chicago, or New York City. The sending and receiving networks pay an unnecessary 
cost for this inefficient handling of data that should remain local. Participants in this local exchange point 
reduce their costs and improve performance and reliability for their local Internet traffic with the equal 
basis of cost recovery. However, the local peering is confined to only local traffic. Outbound traffic to 
other areas still has to depend on the IBP’s transit service.  
                                                 
34 Source: http://www.pitx.net/about.html 
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GigaPoP (Gigabit Point of Presence) is another future Internet exchange model, which is being realized 
by the Internet 2 project35. The difference between NAP and GigaPoP is while a NAP is a neutral, Layer 2 
meet point, a GigaPoP is a value-added, layer 2/3 meet point. (Minoli and Schmidt, 1999) GigaPoP serves 
a peering point as well as a regional aggregation point. The consolidation of regional traffic allows 
members of GigaPoP to save cost by economies of scale and it gives them a market power to negotiate 
with other networks. 
 
3.5 Peering Decision-Making Process 
An interconnection strategy may be different according to its priority. If expense of interconnection is the 
number one issue, ISPs will try to find as many peering partners as they can and try to choose minimum 
combination costs among them. Or if performance is the top priority, they may prefer private peering or 
transit to public peering. All of interconnection decisions should start from the analysis of their own 
traffic. Then the ISP tries to find the available options and negotiates with their interconnection partners 
for interconnection methodology, interconnection line capacity, interconnection settlement, etc. This 
process will be explained below in detail. (Norton, 1999) 
 
Phase I: Identification of ISP’s Traffic 
The costs of peering and transit vary according to the distance of the ISPs’ POP and interconnection 
point. Generally, the cost of transit is expensive than that of peering. Before deciding on a transit or 
peering arrangement, the ISP may systematically sample inbound and outbound traffic flows and then 
map these flows to the originating Autonomous System (AS36). Calculations are made to determine where 
to reduce the load on the expensive transit paths. 
 
Phase II: Finding Potential Interconnection Partners 
Based on the traffic map and its analysis, ISPs try to find interconnection partners. Because peering 
policies are often exposed only under Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA), it is not easy to know them in 
advance of negotiations. It is reasonable for an ISP to find its peering partners in its own level of Internet 
industry hierarchy. If a top-tier IBPs makes a peering arrangement with a second tier IBPs, then the latter 
could be formers’ competitor. Therefore, higher tier ISPs prefer selling transit service to lower tier ISPs 
and have an incentive to reduce the number of their own competitors. Many ISPs except for top tier IBPs 
                                                 
35 Internet2 is a cooperative project involving more than 120 top U.S. universities, along with invited high-
technology corporations. One of the primary goal s of Internet2 is to develop the next generation of computer 
network applications and the underlying broadband infrastructure to facilitate the research and education missions of 
universities. (Minoli and Schmidt, 1999) 
36 AS is defined as a collection of networks that are under the administrative control of a single organization and that 
share a common routing strategy. 
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have adopted a hybrid approach to interconnection, peering with a number of ISPs and paying for transit 
from one or more IBPs in order to have access to the transit provider as well as the peering partners of the 
transit provider. 
 
Phase III: Implementing Interconnection Methodology 
Since peering is seen as being of mutual benefit, both parties explore the interconnection methods that 
will most effectively exchange traffic. Both parties decide (1) how many interconnection points they 
have,  (2) where to locate the interconnection points, (3) how they interconnect, direct circuit or 
exchange-based interconnection, (4) what line capacity they will use, (5) what kind of peering, 
settlement-free or ratio-based peering, etc.  
 
Table 3-1 illustrates comparison of per Mega-bit cost of transit, private peering, and public peering. If we 
compare cost per Mbps shipped (CPMS37) per month of OC3 capacity, the order from the cheapest is 
public peering ($30), private peering ($64~$129), and transit ($464). 
 
[Table 3-1] Per M-bit Cost Comparison 
Interconnection Type Capacity Cost / Capacity Per M bit Cost 
DS3 $26,000/45M $578/MTransit 
OC3 $72,000/155M  $464/M
OC3 ($10,000~$20,000) /155M/2 $64/M ~ $129/MPrivate Peering 
 OC12 ($20,000~$30,000) /622M/2 $32/M ~$48/M
DS3 $3,900/45M $87/MPublic Peering 
OC3 $4,700/155M $30/M
• Source: AT&T (Transit), Norton (2000, Private Peering), and Chicago NAP (Public Peering) 
 
3.6 New Approaches 
To overcome issues of free-rider and asymmetric traffic pattern under the current peering arrangement, 
new approaches are introduced: (1) Best Exit Routing and (2) Traffic Ratio-Based Peering. The peering 
burden upon the ISPs’ networks is aggravated by the hot potato routing. The only solution to overcome 
this scenario is “best exit routing,” which involves imposing responsibility on the web farm to carry the 
traffic to an exit point closest to the location of the IBP’s customers. To overcome the current free peering 
problem, a traffic-ratio based paid peering model is emerging. In this approach, peering is free until traffic 
asymmetry reaches a certain ratio, i.e., 4:1. At this point, the net source of traffic will pay the net sink of 
traffic a fee based upon traffic flow above this ratio. (Norton, 1999) 
 
                                                 
37 The cost per Mbit/s shipped figure is often used as a benchmark to determine interconnection strategy. 
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[CHAPTER 4] QOS AND ITS TECHNOLOGY 
In this chapter, we introduce concepts of QoS, MPLS, and Diffserv, which will be a basis in the network 
modeling part of this dissertation. At the end, we explain the general requirements for QoS peering. 
 
4.1 Quality of Service 
The Internet was historically built on the simple concept of BE: a datagram with source and destination 
addresses traverses different interconnected networks. Routing decisions are made independently at each 
node, and no guarantees are made for the reliable, timely delivery of data.  
 
As communications services move to the Internet as a basic infrastructure, whether carriers have an 
ability to provide QoS or not is an emerging business issue. For example, with a growth of E-commerce 
and real time applications such as VoIP (Voice over IP) or video-conferencing, the customer demand for 
guaranteed service is rapidly increasing. Further, there are diverse Internet applications, each of which 
may have different quality requirements.  
 
The term QoS was used in the Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model38. The fundamental 
idea of QoS is ‘to enable customers to ask ISPs to establish different levels of service pertaining to the 
customers’ traffic throughput, traffic loss, and response time and to charge the customer for the actual 
level of service provided.’ (Black, 2001, p12) The traffic requirements can be made up of four categories: 
(1) bandwidth, (2) delay, (3) delay jitter, and (4) traffic loss. The provision of bandwidth for an 
application means that the network has sufficient capacity to support the application’s throughput 
requirements, measured in packets per second. Delay can be measured in round-trip-time (RTT), which is 
the time it takes to send a packet to a destination node and receive a reply from that node. Jitter is the 
variation in the delay between the arrivals of packets at the receiver. Traffic loss is the percentage of 
traffic discarded. Failure to meet the requirements of above four parameters can mean unsatisfactory 
service. (Black, 2000, pp.2-3) 
 
This limitation of traditional BE service has not been a serious problem for traditional Internet 
applications such as e-mail and file transfer. Internet traffic has increased as the number of users and 
applications has increased. Internet traffic has not only increased, but it has changed in character. Today’s 
Internet applications such as video-conferencing need high bandwidth and low latency. Especially, E-
                                                 
38 OSI reference model was developed by the International Standards Organization (ISO) as a model for a computer 
communications architecture. It consists of seven layers: (1) physical layer, (2) data link layer, (3) network layer, (4) 
transport layer, (5) session layer, (6) presentation layer, and (7) application layer.   
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commerce business traffic needs high reliability without even small traffic loss. Therefore, we need QoS, 
which can provide consistent, reliable, and timely data delivery.  
 
There have been several approaches for the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)39 to provide QoS:  
Integrated Services (IntServ), Differentiated Service (DiffServ), and Multi-Protocol Label Switching 
(MPLS). The IntServ architecture is based on per-flow resource reservation. To receive resource 
assurance, an application must make a reservation before it can transmit traffic onto the network. Once 
the reservation is established, the application can start to send traffic over the path for which it has 
exclusive use of the resource. The IntServ model was the first attempt to enhance the Internet with QoS 
capabilities. (Wang, 2001) By the late 1990s, ISPs found that IntServ had a scalability problem. To find 
more scalable way to provide better than a BE service, DiffServ and MPLS were developed. However, 
none of above three approaches can provide a full QoS service throughout the whole Internet. The next 
generation Internet must integrate many of the qualities and attributes of switched networks. One of the 
recently emerging models is a DiffServ-MPLS model: MPLS QoS in the backbone network and DiffServ 
QoS in the access network. MPLS technology was developed in direct response to improve quality in 
carrier networks and DiffServ is the leading technology for QoS in the enterprise networks. Therefore 
MPLS can be used with DiffServ to address network layer QoS requirements for specific IP applications. 
We will see more detail for MPLS, DiffServ, and the MPLS-DiffServ model in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Multi-Protocol Label Switching40 
MPLS is a label swapping (mapping) and forwarding technology. The idea of MPLS is to improve the 
performance of network layer routing and the scalability of the network layer. The MPLS uses a concept 
called Functional (Forwarding) Equivalence Class (FEC). An FEC is associated with a prefix of IP 
address (network and sub-network part) and a class of datagrams such as an Internet destination port 
number, or values in the IP type of service (TOS), or IP protocol ID fields. Based on the FEC, a label is 
then negotiated between neighbor MPLS enabled routers from ingress to egress of a routing domain. 
(Black, 2001, p15) 
 
According to Black (2001, pp.6-7), the basic idea of MPLS is similar to zip code in the postal system. A 
piece of mail is forwarded using the zip code to relay the mail. After the mail reaches its destination ZIP 
area, the address is used to forward the mail to its intended reader. The same idea holds for MPLS. An IP 
                                                 
39 IETF is one of the organizations under the Internet Society, which is responsible for protocol engineering and 
development. 
40 Most of this section comes from the paper, “Rosen, E., et. al., “Multiprotocol Label Switching 
Architecture,” RFC3031, Jan. 2001. 
 25 
packet is sent to an MPLS-enabled router, called an ingress Label Switching Router (LSR), for delivery to 
a destination IP address. The router appends a label to the packet. Therefore, the label, instead of the IP 
address, is used in the network to forward the traffic. Once the traffic has reached the end of the label 
path, i.e., an egress LSR, the IP address is used to make the final delivery to the end user. Figure 4-1 
shows MPLS network components and a format of the MPLS label.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 4-1] MPLS Network and Label Format 
 
The MPLS header is 32 bits long and is created at the ingress LSR. It must be behind any layer-2 headers 
and in front of a layer-3 header. Table 4-1 explains MPLS header. 
 
[Table 4-1] MPLS Header 
Label Label Value 20 bits MPLS label 
Exp Experimental Use 3 bits QoS classification with DiffServ 
S Stack 1 bit Used to stack multiple labels (Nested Multiple 
MPLS structure) 
TTL Time to Live 8 bits Places a limit on how many hops the MPLS 
packet can traverse 
 
No. of bits (32) 20 3 1 8 
MPLS Label Label Exp. S TTL 
MPLS Domain
Ingress 
LSR 
Transit LSR Egress LSR
User User
LFIB 
Incoming label: 
Outgoing label 
IP Payload IP Header MPLS 
Header
Layer-2 
Header
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The LSR creates a local binding for a particular FEC by arbitrarily selecting a label from a pool of free 
labels in the label information base and updating its LFIB (Label Forwarding Information Base). The 
LFIB includes incoming label, outgoing label, next hop, and outgoing interface. The LFIB incoming label 
is set to the label selected from the label pool. The next hop is set to the layer-3 address of the next hop 
associated with the FEC, and the outgoing interface is set to the egress interface used to reach the next 
hop. (Alwayn, 2002, p60) The route taken by an MPLS-labeled packet is called the Label Switched Path 
(LSP). 
 
The packet is encapsulated into an outer packet, and the header of the outer packet has the label number. 
This idea is called a label switching tunnel, which means the inner packet is not examined by the internal 
LSRs within the network. Their only concern is the processing of the outer packet header’s label and 
handling the packet. At the egress LSR, the packet is decapsulated, and the destination IP address, along 
with the other identifier, is used to determine how the packet is treated at the receiving node. (Black, 
2001, p26) 
 
4.3 Differentiated Service41 
DiffServ (DS) is a unique layer-3 QoS technology and it can address a wide range of QoS requirements 
for a connectionless IP network. The key ideas of DS are: (1) to classify traffic at the boundaries of a 
network and (2) to condition this traffic at the boundaries. DS classifies packets according to their 
common characteristics. The collected packets are called Behavioral Aggregates (BAs).  The traffic is 
assigned a value, a differentiated services code-point (DSCP), which uses the first 6 bits of the IPv4 type 
of service (TOS) field. After the packets have been classified at the boundary of the network, they are 
forwarded through the network based on the DSCP. The forwarding is performed on a per-hop basis, 
which is called Per-Hop Behavior (PHB). (Black, 2001, p158) The following table shows a matching 
between TOS field and DSCP field.  
[Table 4-2] TOS and DSCP 
Bit position 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TOS (IPv4) Precedence D T R C MBZ 
DSCP DS-Field 
Classification Drop-Priority 
CU (Currently 
Unused) 
* D: Delay, T: Throughput, R: Reliability, and C: Cost 
 
                                                 
41 Most of this section comes from (1) Black, S. et. al., “An Architecture for Differentiated Services,” RFC2475, 
Dec. 1998 and (2) Nichols, K. et. al., “Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and 
Ipv6 headers,” RFC 2474, Dec. 1998. 
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The IPv4 type of service (TOS) field can be used to identify several QoS functions provided for an 
Internet application. Transit delay, throughput, reliability, and cost can be requested with this field. The 
DSCP is 6 bits in length. The remaining two bits of the TOS field are currently unused (CU). The left-
most bit signifies bit 0 of the field, and the right-most bit signifies bit 5. The entire 6 bits of the DSCP are 
used by DS nodes as an index into a table to select a specific packet handling mechanism. The first 3 bits 
in the DSCP are used for classification and the last 3 bits in the DSCP are used for drop-priority. 
 
DS domain is a network or a collection of networks operating under an administration with a common 
provisioning policy. DS domain consists of a contiguous set of nodes that are DS-compliant and DS 
domain also operates with common PHB definition. The PHB defines how a collection of packets with 
the same DSCP is treated. The PHB provides a hop-by-hop resource allocation and allows the support of 
differentiated services. A PHB group is a set of one or more PHBs. The PHB group allows a set of related 
forwarding behavior to be specified together. Once past the ingress node and inside the DS domain, the 
internal nodes continue to forward packets based on the DSCP. Their job is to map the DSCP value to a 
supported PHB. (Black, 2000, pp256-7) Figure 4-2 summarizes the DS network explained above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 4-2] DS Network 
 
The packets that are presented to a specific traffic conditioner constitute a Traffic Profile (TP).  Figure 4-3 
shows a logical view of the relationships of the key DS functions for DS packet classification and traffic 
conditioning operations. A traffic stream is selected by a classifier and sent to a traffic conditioner. DS 
uses the term Traffic Conditioning Block (TCB) to describe the overall conditioning operations. If 
appropriate, a meter is used to measure the traffic against a traffic profile. The result of the metering 
DS 
Ingress
Interior 
DS node
DS Egress user 
      DS Domain
user
 
Traffic  
Classifier Traffic Conditioner
TP1 
TP4
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procedure may be used to mark, shape, or drop the traffic based on the packet being “in-profile” or “out-
of-profile.” (Black, 2000, p260) 
 
 
 
 
 
          
  
 
[Figure 4-3] Traffic Conditioning Block 
 
Multiple DS domains constitute a DS region. Theses regions support differentiated services along paths in 
the domains that make up the DS region. One advantage to defining a DS region is that DS allows the DS 
domains in the same DS region to support different PHB groups. For example, a DS domain on a college 
campus may have different PHB group than a DS domain in a corporate network. These two peering DS 
domains must be able to inter-work in a predictable and structured manner. They must define a peering 
requirement that establishes a TCA for the traffic that flows between them. (Black, 2000, p258) Figure 4-
4 shows the relationship between DS Domain and DS Region. 
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[Figure 4-4] DS Region and DS Domain 
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There are three classes of PHBs: (1) Default (DE), (2) Expedited Forwarding (EF), and (3) Assured 
Forwarding (AF). The default PHB is the conventional best-effort forwarding operation. A default PHB 
should be given some bandwidth. The default code-point for the default PHB is ‘000 000’. The code point 
for the expedited forwarding (EF) is ‘101 110.’ The DS traffic conditioning block must treat the EF PHB 
as the highest priority of all traffic. Assured Forwarding (AF) enables a DS domain to support different 
levels of forwarding assurances for IP traffic. Four AF classes are defined in relation to three drop-
preferences. In case of congestion, the drop preference for the packet determines its relative importance 
within the AF class. Even if PHBs are implemented on both sides of a DS boundary, the DSCP still may 
be re-marked. Table 4-3 shows the DSCP values of AF PHB. 
 
[Table 4-3] DSCP of AF PHB 
Drop Preference Class 1 (AF1) Class 2 (AF2) Class 3 (AF3) Class 4 (AF4) 
Low 001 010 010 010 011 010 100 010 
Medium 001 100 010 100 011 100 100 100 
High 001 110 010 110 011 110 100 110 
 
4.4 Network Model: DiffServ-MPLS-DiffServ42 
The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) has been considering how to integrate DiffServ and MPLS. 
Before I explain the network model, it would be better to compare the two protocols. Although MPLS is 
connection-oriented and DS is connectionless, there is a similarity in marking priority at boundaries in 
each network. Table 4-4 summarizes comparison of DS and MPLS (Stephenson, 1999).  
 
[Table 4-4] Comparison between DiffServ and MPLS 
 DiffServ MPLS 
Position Layer-3 Between Layer-2 and Layer-3 
Operation 
 
Take IP TOS field and rename it DS 
field and use it to carry information 
about packet service requirement 
Layer-3 traffic can be mapped to label 
containing specific routing information to 
each IP packet and allow routers to assign 
explicit path to various classes of traffic 
Decision Point DS Ingress Router Ingress LSR 
Upgrade Software Upgrade New Investment for MPLS capable router 
but compatible with Layer-2 switch  
Type of Network Enterprise Network Core of Carrier Network 
 
                                                 
42 Most of this part comes from the paper: Le Faucheur, F., et al., “MPLS Support of Differentiated Services,” draft-
ietf-mpls-diff-ext-09.txt, April, 2001. 
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AT&T and Worldcom already started offering Class of Service (CoS) based on the MPLS. The other 
large IBPs have been upgrading their backbone network for the MPLS. According to the above table, 
even though MPLS technology is compatible with existing layer-2 backbone network technologies such 
as ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) or FR (Frame Relay), a new investment in MPLS capable 
routers is needed. However, in the case of DS, if the current network routers are distribution layer 
routers43, upgrading an NOS (Network Operating System) makes it possible to use DS. Therefore, the 
MPLS core network and the DS access network model is a plausible combination. In this dissertation, we 
assume that IAP1 and IAP2 have a choice of DS and that IBP is equipped with MPLS. 
 
How can the integration between MPLS and DS work? The boundary LSRs of MPLS network must have 
an ability to recognize DS packets. There are two requirements for the MPLS ingress LSR. It has to (1) be 
configured to support both MPLS and DS operations and (2) match DS PHB to MPLS flow.  
 
MPLS header has a 3-bit field called “Exp”, which can provide MPLS for up to eight DS classes (=23).  
However, the length of DSCP is 6 bits, which supports up to 64 classes of service (=26). In this case, there 
are two methods for matching classes between MPLS and DS according to the number of supporting 
classes: (1) Exp-LSP44 and (2) Label-LSP45. 
 
4.4.1 Exp-LSP 
By using the Exp field of MPLS header, a single LSP can be used to support up to eight BAs, which 
means that the PHB of the LSR is inferred from the Exp field. The first 3 bits of the DSCP field are 
copied into the MPLS Exp field at the ingress LSR. Each LSR along the LSP maps Exp bits to a PHB. 
Figure 4-5 explains how Exp-LSP can work in matching between MPLS and DS.  
 
For example, in figure 4-6 there are only two classes of services (BE and Premium) and we could use Exp 
value 000 for BE class and 001 for Premium class. LSRs would be configured to provide default behavior 
to the 000 packets and EF PHB to the 001 packets. The MPLS label tells LSRs where to forward a packet 
while the Exp bits tell them what PHB to treat the packet with. In the following figure, a single Exp-LSP 
carries packets of two different PHBs. The PHB to be applied to packets is determined by examining the 
Exp bits: ‘000’ for BE class and ‘001’ for Premium class. (Davie and Rekhter, 2001) 
                                                 
43 There is three-layer router hierarchy: access layer, distribution layer, and core layer. Access layer routers have a 
function of access server connecting remote users to internetworks. Distribution layer routers are used to separate 
slow-speed local traffic from the high-speed backbone. Core layer is the backbone layer. 
44 Exp-Inferred-PSC LSPs in the original draft 
45 Label-Only-Inferred-PSC LSPs in the original draft 
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[Figure 4-5] Exp-LSP  
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[Figure 4-6] Exp-LSP Example 
 
4.4.2 Label-LSP 
If more than eight PHBs are needed in the MPLS network, Label LSPs are used. In the Label-LSP case, 
the PHB of LSR is inferred from the label. The label-to-PHB mapping is signaled. In the case of DE or 
EF, one PHB can be mapped onto one Label-LSP. However, in the AF case, AF packets of the same 
class, for example AF11, AF12, and AF13, can be aggregated into a FEC, which can be assigned into an 
LSP. We call a group of the same AF class PHB Scheduling Class (PSC). The drop precedence is 
encoded into the Exp field in the MPLS header. In the case of ATM or FR, where the MPLS header is not 
used, the PHB is carried in the VCI (Virtual Channel Identifier) field or DLCI (Data Link Connection 
Identifier) field and the drop precedence is encoded into the CLP (Cell Loss Priority) bit or DE (Discard 
Eligibility) bit. Figure 4-7 explains how Label-LSP can work in matching between MPLS and DS.  
 
For example, there are 14 classes of services (EF, AFxy46, and DE). In figure 4-8, two Label-LSPs are 
established even with a same LSP: One for DF and the other for AF1 (AF11, AF12, AF13). The packets 
                                                 
46 x = class 1 ~ 4 and y = drop preference 1 ~ 3, i.e., AF11, AF12, AF13, AF21, AF22, AF23, AF31, AF32, AF33, 
AF41, AF42, AF43.  
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with ‘000 000’ DSCP will take the lower Label-LSP for the DE PHB and the packets with ‘001 010’, 
‘001 100’, and ‘001 110’ DSCPs will take the upper Label-LSP for the AF1 PSC. For DF or EF traffic, a 
single LSP will carry packets of single PHB, and for AF traffic, an LSP will carry of the same AFx class 
with different drop preferences. In the Exp-LSP, a single LSP is enough to carry up to 8 classes but in the 
Label-LSP multiple LSPs are needed to carry various kinds of traffic classes. (Davie and Rekhter, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 4-7] Label-LSP 
 
 [Figure 4-8] Label-LSP 
 
4.5 QoS Enabled NAP and QoS Peering   
Even a large IBP can not cover all users everywhere, so a global company with many branches worldwide 
needs more than one IBP’s connectivity. For example, if a branch in Europe has a service from UUNET 
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and another branch in Asia has a service from AT&T WorldNet, UUNet and AT&T WorldNet need to 
connect each other for the end-to-end integrated QoS service for their common customer. However, they 
have a reluctance to connect directly with each other since they have to show their MPLS network 
information to the other for the end-to-end QoS connection. This is critical business information, i.e., 
location of major interconnecting point, network capacity, and detailed routing technology. Therefore, an 
MPLS-enabled neutral NAP is inevitable for QoS peering. The router in the MPLS-enabled NAP has to 
connect two MPLS domains. 
 
Traditional NAPs with an architecture based on LAN or ATM are under the control of big telecom 
carriers. For the QoS peering, many ISPs and IBPs want a neutral NAP, which does not belong to any 
carrier. In the QoS Internet, in addition to the BE peering requirements such as network interface capacity 
and routing power, peering ISPs have to consider (1) that they have the same CoS structure, (2) that they 
treat traffic of same class fairly, and (3) that they agree on traffic ratio, settlement rate, traffic loss penalty 
rate, and monitoring method. Each QoS peering ISP wants its traffic treated equally in the other’s network 
as it treats its traffic in its own network. Therefore, each QoS peering ISP has to have an agreement of the 
following areas such as admission control, congestion control, and dropping discipline.   
(1) Admission Control at the peering point: At the boundary router, traffic will be metered according 
to its class. If more traffic enters than its traffic profile, traffic rate management is needed. QoS 
peering ISPs should have an agreement on whether they will use traffic policing47 or traffic 
shaping48 for the bursting traffic. At the boundary router, token bucket will be used as a means to 
determine whether a packet is compliant or noncompliant. When metering traffic by a token 
bucket, parameters such as token arriving rate or conformed burst size must be agreed to in 
advance between two QoS peering ISPs, which will decide dropping policy for exceeding traffic 
against conformed burst point. 
(2) Congestion Control at each network domain: After one ISP’s QoS traffic is admitted into the 
other’s network, the two ISPs have to agree on the treatment of traffic during network congestion. 
It is related to scheduling, queue management, and bandwidth allocation. If one peering ISP uses 
WFQ49 (Weighted Fair Queuing) as a scheduling discipline and the other uses strict priority 
                                                 
47 Traffic Policing is provided by Committeed Access Rate (CAR), which doesn’t buffer or smooth traffic and might 
drop packets when the allowed bursting capability is exceeded. (Vegesna, 2001) 
48 Traffic Shaping is a mechanism to smooth the traffic flow on an interface to avoid congestion on the link and to 
meet a service provider’s requirements. (Vegesna, 2001) 
49 In WFQ, each flow or traffic class is assigned a weight, and the rate at which a flow or a traffic class is serviced is 
proportional to its assigned weight. (Vegesna, 2001) 
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queuing50, the traffic of the same class would be treated differently in each network. QoS peering 
ISPs have to consider how to calibrate a weight to be served equally. For example, delay-sensitive 
traffic like VoIP, might be served by strict priority queuing and the other class of traffic might be 
served by the WFQ with a ratio of 5:3:2. 
(3) Packet Dropping Policy: When the congestion happens, what kind of packet dropping approach 
will be used, tail-dropping or random early dropping (RED)? If both ISPs use the RED, which 
algorithm will be used, average queue size computation or packet drop probability? If the 
platinum queue is overflowing, dropping the excess traffic or transferring it to a lower level queue 
should be agreed in advance.  
(4) Settlement Rate and Packet Loss Penalty Rate: In the premium classes (platinum, gold, and 
silver), it is possible to use traffic ratio based peering: The higher the class, the tighter the traffic 
ratio, i.e., 1:1 for platinum class, 1:2 for gold class, and 1:3 for silver class. Different settlement 
rates will be applied to the different classes: The higher the class, the higher the settlement rate, 
because of higher value of traffic in the higher class. The other important ratio in the QoS peering 
is the packet-dropping ratio. Even in the platinum class, there is a possibility of packet loss. If it 
faces congestion, overflow traffic might be transferred to lower level of classes or just dropped. In 
the case of real time application or business critical data, packet dropping can cause a serious 
problem for QoS. If a QoS peering partner cannot accommodate the other’s traffic in profile, the 
former should pay the penalty for the dropped traffic. In this case, the higher the class, the higher 
the packet-dropping penalty. 
 
 
                                                 
50 In the Priority Queuing, packets on the highest priority queue are transmitted first. No packets in the lower priority 
queue are served if packets in the higher priority queue are waiting for service. (Vegesna, 2001) 
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[CHAPTER 5] BACKGROUND OF INTERNET QOS GAME MODEL 
 
5.1 Model Components 
There are two well-known models in the game theory: Cournot and Bertrand. In the Cournot model firms’ 
output level is a strategic variable and in the Bertand model price of a product is a strategic variable. The 
main assumption of the above two models is homogeneity of the product and no entry.  According to 
Carlton and Perloff (1999, pp155-7), game theory analyzes the interactions between rational, decision-
making individuals who may not be able to predict fully the outcomes of their decisions. A duopoly game 
has three common elements: (1) there are two firms, (2) each firm attempts to maximize its profit, and (3) 
each firm is aware that other firm’s actions can affect its profit. Game theory uses the concept of  ‘Nash 
equilibrium,’ which is a set of strategies if, holding the strategies of all other firms constant, no firm can 
obtain a higher payoff (profit) by choosing a different strategy. 
 
In this dissertation, we choose the Cournot duopoly model with an assumption that each IAP produces a 
homogeneous Internet access service with limited capacity. The sum of their products equals the market 
output, which determines the market price. In our model, beside output level, which is assumed to be a 
short-term variable, there are four long-term strategic variables: quality, network capacity, pricing, and 
interconnection. Once each IAP determines its long term decisions, it is assumed to maximize its profit 
simultaneously. In this model, we use a best-response function (or best-reaction function), which is a best 
action by a firm given its beliefs about the action its rival takes. (Carlton and Perloff, p159) The Nash 
equilibrium lies in the intersection of both firm’s best response functions.  
 
The basic model components are: (1) two IAPs (IAP1 and IAP2) in a rural area Internet access market 
without the possibility of new entrants, and (2) one IBP who can connect both of IAPs. The two IAPs can 
independently buy a transit service from the IBP for the Internet access, or they can peer with each other. 
Our concern is the Internet access market even if the IBP can influence the profits of the two IAPs. Figure 
5-1 shows the basic model components.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 5-1] Basic Model Components 
 
 IAP-1 IAP-2
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This duopoly and no entry scenario is a reasonable one to analyze even in a highly competitive Internet 
industry.  According to Greenstein (1999), 2069 counties (66%) out of 3139 in the U.S. had two or fewer 
IAPs in the fall of 1998; 87% of these 2069 counties are rural. While national IAPs usually concentrate in 
major urban areas and moderate density suburban areas, low-density rural areas are usually served by 
local providers. In these low-density areas, the national IAPs do not have local POPs51 (Points of 
Presences) so their customers would be forced to use measured service via a toll free number52. Thus, 
users of national IAPs have to pay a usage-based data communication fee as well as the IAP’s 
subscription fee. An important competitive advantage of local IAPs is a lower access cost for the local 
population. In addition to the cost advantage against the national IAPs, the rural market is too small to 
sustain additional IAP beyond existing two IAPs. Therefore, we use ‘no entry’ assumption in the model 
even though the entry barrier in the access market is relatively low.  
 
These two IAPs can produce BE or QoS. We assume that there is only one class in BE and there are two 
classes in QoS. The lower class of QoS is the same as BE and a higher class of QoS is a guaranteed 
service. Therefore, all QoS users are BE users in our model and the number of the QoS users as well as 
the BE users can influence a price of BE. The service with same quality is assumed to be homogeneous, 
i.e. there is no quality difference between QoS services from IAP1 and IAP2 and it is assumed that users’ 
Internet connection time after introducing QoS will not change. 
 
5.2 Internet Access Technology 
The Internet access technologies are roughly divided into two categories: narrow band access using dial-
up modem technology and broadband access such as cable-modem, DSL, and wireless technology. 
Broadband access technologies will eventually replace the dial-up modem narrowband access technology 
in the future Internet access market. However, dial-up narrowband access is still dominant in the U.S. 
Internet access market and will be for the foreseeable future especially in rural areas. According to several 
research studies of Internet access technology’s market penetration in Appendix B (U.S. GAO 2001, 
McClure 2001, Bright 2000, NTIA & RUS 2000, and Grassman 2001), the penetration of broadband 
technology is 10% of households (or subscribers) in the U.S. In a recent paper (Strover, 2002), the 
prospects for near-term broadband services in rural region are dim and existing policy approaches appear 
insufficient to achieve the goal of widespread rural deployment. Therefore, we assume that subscribers in 
the rural area generally use dial-up modems to access their IAP, so our analysis will be restricted to 56 
                                                 
51 Any site where networks interconnect is may be referred to as a POP. 
52 For example, AOL’s usage price for 1-800 number (28.8Kbps) is 10 cents / minute. 
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Kbps dial-up modem technology. Thus, the QoS services that subscribers might use are most likely audio-
oriented, such as Internet radio, VoIP or audio conferencing, and possibly also low bit rate video. 
 
5.3 Pricing Scheme 
The main pricing scheme in the current Internet access market is flat rate pricing, for example, unlimited 
Internet access for a fixed amount of money per month. A consumer can connect to the Internet as much 
as he wants, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. The reasons to use flat rate pricing are: (1) IAPs do not 
have to meter their customer’s traffic for billing, (2) customers prefer flat rating pricing to usage-sensitive 
pricing, and (3) flat-rate pricing encourages Internet usage because users do not worry about additional 
cost for usage. However, flat rate pricing leads to a ‘tragedy of commons’ phenomenon, i.e., the 
congestion of the Internet. After introducing QoS, it may be possible or even necessary to introduce 
usage-sensitive pricing, because the value of QoS traffic is higher than that of BE traffic. To reduce 
customers’ resistance to pure usage-sensitive pricing, flat rate pricing will remain for BE and a new 
pricing scheme will be introduced for the new product (QoS).  
 
Generally speaking, when firms do not exactly know consumers’ willingness-to-pay, a common approach 
is to use two-part tariff, which charges a lump-sum fee for the right to purchase plus a per-unit charge for 
each unit consumed. In the Internet industry, the two-part tariff is not fully efficient because the added 
fixed charges may deter some users who at marginal would be willing to join the network and consume. 
(Cawley, 1997) One QoS pricing scheme in the model is the two-part tariff: Flat-rate for the BE class and 
per-hour charge for the premium class. The fixed part lump-sum fee is the right to use the lowest class of 
the QoS service (BE) and the variable part is for the consumption of the premium classes of the QoS 
service. Someone who only wants to use a BE service pays only fixed part lump-sum fee. We assume that 
each IAP uses flat-rate pricing for its BE service and flat-rate or a two-part tariff for its QoS service. 
 
5.4 Product Differentiation Theory  
IAPs usually wish to differentiate themselves from other IAPs because product differentiation gives them 
market power. However, the current Internet, which can not guarantee any quality level, offers few 
opportunities for product differentiation except for increasing capacity to avoid congestion. This method, 
which we call ‘over-engineering,’ also has limitations because of the exponential increase of Internet 
traffic, Internet users, and IAPs. 
 
According to Carlton and Perloff (1999, p79), product differentiation is defined as related products that 
have varying characteristics so that consumers do not view them as perfect substitutes. For example, 
 38 
Apple computers (Mac) are not perfect substitutes for IBM compatible computers. This kind of product 
differentiation between Apple and IBM is called ‘horizontal product differentiation.’ The other product 
differentiation concept is ‘vertical product differentiation.’  In a vertically differentiated product space, all 
consumers agree on the most preferred mix of characteristics and, more generally, over the preference 
ordering. (Tirole, 1988, p96)  For example, Internet users agree that the quality of QoS service is superior 
to that of BE service. 
 
Professor Gal-Or53 has studied quality differentiation and its strategic usage. (Gal-Or, 1983, 1985, 1987) 
We apply her theory as a foundation of the QoS game theoretic modeling. There are several assumptions 
for the theory: (1) customers are uniformly distributed according to a single taste parameter, and the taste 
parameter determines user’s utility and marginal utility,  (2) products are differentiated on the basis of 
quality54,  (3) each firm can choose levels of quality and quantity55, and (4) each consumer is assumed to 
purchase only one unit of the product if he expects a nonnegative payoff from the purchase.  
 
The preference of a consumer of type X, when purchasing a product of quality M (> 0), is represented by 
his willingness-to-pay function U(M, X), where UM > 0, UX > 0, UMX > 0, UMM < 0, UXX < 0. The taste 
parameter (X) of a consumer is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the compact interval [0, X]. The 
above assumptions imply that utility is gained by purchasing a product of higher quality (UM > 0), that 
consumers of a higher taste parameter value the product more highly (UX > 0), that those who value the 
product more highly gain more by buying products of higher quality (UMX > 0), and that the utility derived 
from the product less than proportionately with the type of the consumer (UXX < 0) and with the quality 
purchased (UMM < 0). Under the above assumptions, each firm decides how much to produce at each 
quality level. At the Nash equilibrium: (1) this decision is the best response to the output decisions of all 
the other firms, given the optimization problem solved by consumers; (2) the price of each quality level is 
determined so the supply of products of quality equals the demand for it. (Gal-Or, 1983) 
 
In the game model of this dissertation, we follow the same assumptions as described above: (1) Users are 
uniformly distributed according to the preference of QoS, (2) services are differentiated on the basis of 
ability to provide QoS, (3) each IAP can choose two quality levels for their service: BE (low quality) or 
                                                 
53 Esther Gal-Or, the Katz School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. 
54 She restricts quality to a single dimension, which implies that any two consumers will agree on which of two 
products they prefer. 
55 She considers output and not price as part of the strategy of a firm so as to extend the Cournot equilibria concept 
from market of homogeneous products to markets of differentiated products. 
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QoS (high quality) and various quantity levels between 0 and its maximum capacity (999, 1999, or 2999), 
and (4) each user is assumed to purchase only one of services, BE or QoS.  
 
5.5 Demand Function 
There are two demands in the Internet access market: (1) access demand and (2) usage demand. The 
demand for access means how much the subscriber would pay for the right to be connected to an IAP’s 
network and the demand for usage means how many hours he would connect at whatever price is charged 
for usage. (Wenders, 1987, pp46-7).  
 
The following two demands equations can be expressed as the access demand for the number of users (Q) 
in the [Eq-1], and the usage demand for the number of QoS usage hours (hQoS) in the [Eq-2]: 
 Q = A0 – A1*F – A2*r ……………….………………………………………….[Eq-1]  
 hQoS = B0 – B1*r ………………………………………………………………...[Eq-2] 
where Q is the number of users (BE and QoS), hQoS is the number of QoS connection hours, F is the fixed 
access price, and the r is the hourly usage rate for QoS connection. The relationships between quantities 
(Q, hQoS) and price factors (F, r) are assumed to be negative, i.e., increasing prices means decreasing 
quantities. 
 
There is no usage demand under flat-rate pricing. Only access demand equation exists with r = 0 in [Eq-
1]. In the two-part tariff, there exist both demand functions. Table 5-1 shows values of coefficients we use 
in the game model. A0 = 5,000 means that when A1 = A2= 0, the maximum number of users in the market 
is 5,000. A1=100 means that one dollar increase in the fixed price causes 100 customers to stop using the 
service. A2 =500 means that one dollar increase in the QoS usage rate (r) causes 500 customers to stop 
using the service. B1=33.3 implies one dollar increase of the QoS usage rate (r) causes 33.3 QoS hour 
reduction. B0=100 means that the maximum number of QoS Internet connection hours is 100 hours per 
month. The detailed explanation for the demand functions of each pricing scheme will be provided below. 
 
[Table 5-1] Values of Coefficients 
Coefficients A0 A1 A2 B0 B1 
Values 5,000 100 500 100 33.3 
 
5.5.1 Demand Function for Flat-Rate Pricing 
We assume that the potential number of Internet user is 5,000, a number derived from demographic data. 
According to Greenstein (1999), in 1996 the IAPs in rural counties with under 50,000 population were 
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overwhelmingly local or regional, and in the fall of 1998 the equivalent figure was 30,000. Extrapolating 
from this trend, we assume that the population of 200156 in our model market is 25,000.  On average, 20% 
of the population would subscribe to dialup service. The estimated number of dial-up users was 60 
million57 in 2001, compared with the U.S. population of 300 million. Applying this percentage (20%) to 
our model market, we compute the number of potential users to be 5,000. 
 
Each user is assumed to purchase exclusively one service, i.e., BE or QoS, from one IAP. Because BE is a 
lowest class of QoS, a QoS user does not have to buy BE and QoS simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
number of Internet connection hours is assumed to be constant after introducing QoS. Under these 
consumer behavior assumptions, we will use the same willingness-to-pay function as Gal-Or did (1983, 
1985): 
U(X, M) = M*(a+bX), a > 0, b > 0, 
where M = level of quality, X = taste factor (i.e., preference to QoS service), and UM > 0, UX > 0, UMX > 0, 
UMM < 0, UXX < 0. 
 
The user payoff (V) is determined by the difference between the user’s willingness-to-pay from the 
consumption of a product and the price of that product. For example, the payoff for a consumption of BE 
is VBE = U(X, MBE) - PBE, and the payoff for a consumption of QoS is VQoS = U(X, MQoS) - PQoS. The user 
will choose his consumption according to the positive value of his payoff, i.e., if VBE > VQoS, then he 
would choose BE, otherwise he would choose QoS. We can sort the users according to their preference to 
QoS, i.e., begin with the user with the least QoS preference to the highest preference user. Figure 5-2 
shows the ordering of users. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 5-2] QoS Preference Line-Up 
 
                                                 
56 Most of the data in this dissertation come from the year 2001. 
57 Including free users (10 millions) and paid users (49.6 millions) at the first quarter of 2001, Source: 
Telecommunications Report International Inc. 
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In the above figure, there are two special users: X* and X**. X* is a marginal user whose payoff is the 
same when he consumes QoS or BE. X** is a marginal user whose payoff is the same when he consume 
BE or nothing. The order of X* in the line equals (5000-QQoS) and that of X** equals (5000-QQoS-QBE). 
The following equation expresses the above two users’ payoff with (X*=5000- QQoS) and (X** =5000-
QQoS-QBE).  
 
(1) For the marginal user X**,   
      (Payoff of not purchasing) = (Payoff of BE consumption) 
                         0  = (Willingness-to-pay of BE at X**) - (Price of BE) 
         0  =  [a + b* (5000 - QQoS- QBE)]*MBE - PBE 
     PBE  =  [a + b* (5000 - QQoS- QBE)]*MBE ……………..……..………..[Eq-3] 
 
(2) For the marginal user X*, 
    (Payoff of BE consumption) = (Payoff of QoS consumption) 
(Willingness-to-pay of BE at X*) - PBE = (Willingness-to-pay of QoS at X*) – PQoS 
           [a + b*(5000 – QQoS)]*MBE- PBE = [a + b*(5000 – QQoS)]*MQoS - PQoS 
                PQoS = PBE+ [a + b*(5000 – QQoS)]*(MQoS -MBE)……………[Eq-4] 
 
In the above two equations, we have to be careful to understand total quantity (=QQoS + QBE), which 
means the quantity demanded by the users who can use BE, because QoS users can consume BE as one of 
QoS classes. 
 
We can say that [Eq-3] is an inverse demand function for the BE service and [Eq-4] is an inverse demand 
function for the QoS service. We assume the number of classes that each IAP can produce with its chosen 
technology could be a value of M, i.e., a value of quality level. For example, the quality level of BE, i.e., 
MBE = ‘1’ and the quality level of QoS, i.e., MQoS = ‘2’ because the QoS includes the BE as a subset of 
classes. We can put MBE = ‘1’ and MQoS = ‘2’ into [Eq-3] and [Eq-4], which can be rewritten as: 
  PBE =  [a + b* (5000 - QQoS- QBE)]*1 ………………………………[Eq-5] 
   PQoS  =  PBE+ [a + b*(5000 – QQoS)]*(2-1) .…..……….………….….[Eq-6] 
 
The current price range of dial-up access service is expected as $0 to $25 per month58. If we assume that 
all potential customers will buy BE access service with $0 per month, the number of customers will be 
5,000, i.e., (PBE, Q) = ($0, 5000 users), becasue (QQoS + QBE) in the [Eq-5] means that the number of users 
                                                 
58 Telecommunications International Inc.’s Quarterly Online Census at March 31, 2000. 
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who can consume a BE service or a BE class as a part of QoS. If we put this pair of numbers into equation 
[Eq-5], we can easily get a value of parameter ‘a’ (= 0). If we assume the price of DSL service is a ceiling 
price for dial-up access, $50 is the maximum price for dial-up access. Over $50 per month, a rational user 
will not buy the dial-up access. Instead he will buy DSL service because it is a superior service. Then, we 
can put (PBE, Q) = ($50, 0 user) into the [Eq-5] and we get a value of parameter b (=0.01). We can rewrite 
the equation [Eq-5] and [Eq-6] with a = 0 and b = 0.01. 
 
    PBE =  [0.01* (5000 - QQoS- QBE)] .…………………………….…….[Eq-7] 
   PQoS =  PBE+ [0.01*(5000 – QQoS)]…….……….……………………..[Eq-8] 
where QBE = q1BE + q2BE and QQoS=q1QoS + q2QoS. 
 
From the [Eq-7], the BE demand function expresses that $1 increasing for local Internet access results in 
100 users leaving. This value is rather price sensitive, which conflicts a general idea of insensitivity of 
Internet access service. Usually, the demand for Internet access service is considered to be insensitive to 
price. The reasons for price-insensitivity are:  
(1) The access demand is considered less sensitive than the usage demand. Under flat-rate pricing, 
user’s price includes both usage and access prices. But precisely speaking, because the quantity 
that users can consume is unbounded, there is no usage demand and the usage price is zero. 
(Wenders, 1987, p46).  Therefore, Internet access service itself is insensitive to the price.  
(2) Network externality effect. A potential user has a tendency to subscribe to the same IAP of his 
friends and family for better and reliable communications between them. Even if monthly price is 
higher than he is willing to pay, he prefers to choose the IAP with as many acquaintances as 
possible.  
(3) Customer lock-in effect. If someone wants to change his current IAP, he has to tolerate the 
inconvenience of notifying his correspondents of his new e-mail addresses. That is the same as 
the local number portability59 issue in the telephone industry, though services such as hotmail, 
yahoo and others minimize this effect by offering addresses that are not associated with IAPs. 
 
However, there are two supporting ideas for our assumption that the demand function that is sensitive to 
price:  
(1) According to MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995), there are two types of users. One has a very high 
value for the service, but only wants to use a little of it, i.e. ASCII e-mail. The other user has a 
                                                 
59 With the advent of local competition, telephone subscribers do not have to change their telephone number when 
they move from one local telephone company to another (2001,Moulton, p101). 
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low willingness-to-pay for the service but wants to consume a very large amount of it, i.e, 
teenager’s downloading MTV videos. The demand function for high value users is insensitive to 
the price but the demand function for low value users is sensitive to the price because they are 
marginal users. With the advent of broadband Internet access service, the high value users for 
dial-up Internet access have been moving to broadband. Therefore, the fraction of low value users 
in the dial-up Internet access market is increasing, which means the demand function is becoming 
more sensitive to the price. 
(2) The USGAO (2001, pp26-27) reports that the largest percentage of users (35%) indicates that 
price is a basis for their choice of dial-up IAP. But among the broadband users, the most common 
reason is that they selected their IAP because it was the company that provided the features and 
applications of most interest to them (23%), which means price is not a top concern of those who 
chose a broadband IAP. Thus, we stand by our assumption that dial-up users in our model are 
relatively price-sensitive. 
 
We can interpret the above two equations [Eq-7] and [Eq-8] as follows: 
(1) Under the BE demand function [Eq-7], we can derive total quantity demanded (Q) in the market. 
The total demand means the quantity consumed for BE and QoS, which can be interpreted as the 
demand by users who want to consume the BE class of service. 
(2) We can derive the price of BE (PBE), which corresponds to the total quantity demanded (Q = QQoS 
+ QBE) in the [Eq-7]. 
(3) We can put this price (PBE) into the QoS demand function [Eq-8] and find QoS quantity (QQoS) 
and QoS price (PQoS). 
(4) BE quantity (QBE) is residual demand after subtracting QoS demand (QQoS) from total quantity 
(Q). 
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Figure 5-3 explains the process of determination of QQoS and QBE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 5-3] The process of determination of QQoS and QBE 
 
5.5.2 Demand Function for Two-Part Tariff 
In this section we try to explain the coefficient value of A2, B0, and B1 in the equation of [Eq-1] and [Eq-
2], which are essential to the two-part tariff. For the value of A2, we don’t have any data because the QoS 
service does not exist at present. The assumptions for A2 are (1) QoS hourly rate (r) also influences a 
quantity of access market and (2) its relationship between r and Q in the [Eq-1] is also negative. We 
tested several values of A2 such as ‘0.1’, ‘0.5’, ‘1’, ‘5’, ‘10’, and ‘50’ and finally A2 = 5 chose considering 
a reasonable range of other variables like QBE, QQoS, and profits of IAP1 and IAP2.  
 
To estimate the usage demand function of [Eq-2], we use the long distance telephone price as a proxy for 
VoIP tariffs, which we anticipate to be a major application of the QoS service in the rural dialup market. 
We assume that 5 cents per minute, i.e., $3 per hour, is a typical competitive long distance rate in the 
United States. From the USGAO report on Internet usage (2001), we can derive an estimate for an 
average number of connection hours60 as shown in table 5-2.   
 
[Table 5-2] Internet Usage 
Answer ~ 1 hr ~ 4 hrs ~ 10 hrs ~15 hrs ~25 hrs ~ 40 hrs ~60 hrs 60 hrs ~ 
Percent 0.0 6.3 12.1 19.4 29.3 19.8 6.3 6.9 
   
                                                 
60 One of the survey questions was “On average, how many hours per week do you and all your members of your 
household spend on the Internet from your home?” 
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[Eq-7] PBE=[50-0.01*(QBE+QQoS)] [Eq-8] PQoS = PBE+[50–0.01*QQoS] 
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Based on the above table, we can use 100 hours61 per month as the typical monthly Internet connection 
time. We assume that after introducing QoS the 100 hours would be divided into BE connection hours 
and QoS connection hours. Total number of connection hours is assumed to be constant. Users of flat rate 
QoS pricing will use 100% QoS connection but users of two-part tariff will not make a QoS connect all 
the time. Our assumptions for the relationship between hourly rate ‘r’ and QoS connection hours ‘hQoS(r)’ 
are: 
(1) The higher the rate r, the lower the QoS usage percentage, 
(2) A range of rate ‘r’ is from $0 to $3 per hour. 
(3) For example, if r = $0, all users use 100% QoS connection. If r = $3, no one uses QoS 
connection. Instead users will use a long distance telephone service. In the absence of market data 
for the QoS, we assume linearity between these endpoints, resulting in table 5-3. 
 
[Table 5-3] Relationship between Usage Rate (r) and QoS Usage (hQoS) 
r $0 $1 $2 $3 
hQoS 100 67 33 0 
hBE 0 33 67 100 
 
According to the above assumptions, we can rewrite [Eq-1] and [Eq-2] into the following [Eq-9] and [Eq-
10]: 
 F = 50 – 0.01*Q – 5*r ……………………………………….…………………..[Eq-9] 
 r  = 3 – (1/33.3)*hQoS …………………………………………..………………..[Eq-10] 
 
In our assumption, the fixed part of two-part tariff is the price of BE service, so [Eq-9] can be rewritten as  
PBE = 50 – 0.01* Q – 5*r …………………………………………………….…[Eq-11] 
 
These equations imply that the QoS usage rate (r) as well as the number of users (Q) can influence the 
price of BE service. The demand function of the [Eq-11] will be used when the two-part tariff is involved 
in the game model, i.e., Cases 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10. 
 
5.6 Revenue Function 
The revenue function of each IAP is assumed to have generally two components: (1) the revenue obtained 
from the subscribers and (2) those received from the advertisers that present their announcements in the 
IAP’s web pages. In our analysis these two revenues will be calculated on a monthly basis. 
                                                 
61 {(2 hrs* 0.063) +(7 hrs*0.121)+(12.5 hrs*0.194)+(20 hrs*0.293)+(32.5 hrs*0.198)+(50 hrs* 0.063)+ (75 
hrs*0.069)}*4.3 = 103.2774 hours per month. 
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The subscription revenue is directly related with each IAP’ price structure and quantity demanded in the 
market situation. If an IAP produces QoS with a flat-rate, its revenue is sum of BE revenue (= QBE*PBE) 
and QoS revenue (= QQoS*PQoS), otherwise, BE revenue alone. If the IAP chooses a usage-sensitive price 
structure for QoS, then QoS subscription revenue will have a different form, (= QQoS*PBE + QQoS*hQoS*r).  
This means that all QoS users have to pay PBE for their connection and right to use BE class, and they 
have also to pay additional QoS usage.  
   
The advertising revenue is similar to that of newspaper and broadcasting industries. In reality, the number 
of hits on a specific advertisement in web pages determines payment for that advertisement, but in our 
model we simply assume that the monthly advertising revenue per subscriber is constant. According to 
AOL’s 2000 annual report62, the advertising revenue was $2,000 million. If we assume that the number of 
AOL’s subscribers in 2000 is 20 million63, the average monthly advertising revenue was approximately 
$8 per subscriber. However, the rural IAPs will probably not earn the same per subscriber in advertising 
revenue as AOL. Because of their small size and scope, the IAPs with local coverage are not as attractive 
for advertisers as AOL with national coverage and large customer base. With the absence of rural IAP’s 
advertising rate, we will use $8 per subscriber as an advertising rate. From this point of view, the number 
of subscribers is an important factor for the advertising revenue of IAPs. This type of revenue can justify 
increase of capacity with a lower price of Internet access service to acquire more subscribers. In an 
extreme case, subscription price per month may be reduced to zero and only the advertising revenue can 
be a source of income for an IAP. 
 
5.7 Cost Function  
The cost structure of the Internet industry is characterized by large, up-front sunk costs and near zero, 
short run marginal traffic cost. It is well known that with congestion-free network the cost to carry or 
process an additional minute of Internet traffic approaches zero, because the incremental cost is near zero. 
(Frieden, 1998) In our model, the measuring unit of cost is not traffic but a subscriber, i.e. the cost is 
calculated by the number of subscribers. The basic assumptions of the cost structure in our model are (1) 
large, up-front, irreversible sunk cost and (2) low constant marginal cost for additional subscriber. Under 
these assumptions, the duopolists must cover the following three types of costs to be able to provide their 
services: capital (cc), interconnection (transit:ct or peering:cp), and operation costs (co). Capital and 
                                                 
62 We chose this year instead of 2001 because it preceded the merger with Time Warner, which could obscure the 
reporting of these revenues. 
63 This number is estimated from the fact that the number of subscriber at first quarter of 2001 is 22.7 millions. 
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interconnection costs are evaluated in similar ways, and are characterized simultaneously. Operation costs 
are treated differently and will be discussed below. 
 
5.7.1 Cost of BE-IAP 
The operation costs are related with the number of subscribers. The operatinon cost includes the set-up 
cost for network connectivity such as login account, allocation of storage, user registration, etc. and 
maintenance costs for a single user of the network. These types of costs increase as the number of users 
increase. The operation cost for the BE service is assumed to be linear function. 
 
The capital costs are consist predominantly of the equipment that an IAP needs to provide its services, 
that is, mail-server, access layer router, and modem pool. The transit costs are payments by an IAP to an 
IBP for the right to use the IBP’s facilities to transmit the communications of the IAP’s subscribers. 
Although the price of bandwidth is decreasing substantially and the demand for T3 lines64 and optical 
links are increasing, a T1 line still dominates the market65 especially for rural IAPs. We assume that the 
IBP sells only T1 connections to the IAPs, which is reasonable given that these are small IAPs serving a 
rural area. 
 
It is assumed here that these two types of costs (capital and interconnection) increase in equal steps. This 
means that an IAP to provide services to 0 to n–1 subscriber(s) must purchase equipment worth $cc and 
must pay $ct to an IBP for transit capabilities. For n to 2*n-1 subscribers the cost increases to 2*(cc+ct), 
and so on. When the number of subscribers of a duopolist ranges between k*n and (k+1)*n-1, the costs of 
the duopolist are (k+1)*(cc+ ct).  
 
We assume that the value n is 1,000 BE subscribers. The calculation of 1,000 BE subscribers per one set 
of equipment and one T1 line is made under the following assumptions: 
(1) The capacity between CO and IAP modem pool is determined by a concentration ratio of 1:10 
(the number of modems to the number of subscribers). That means 100 modems are enough to 
support 1,000 subscribers. 
(2) The capacity between the IAP and the IBP is determined by several factors. We already assume 
T1 line (=1.544 Mbps) and 56 Kbps modems as a basic connection, and we add 1:6 bandwidth- 
ratio to this assumptions. The bandwidth-ratio occurs because a user does not consume 56 Kbps 
                                                 
64 The bandwidth of T3 line is 45.736 Mbps, which equals to that of 28 T1 lines. 
65 At year 2000, T1:1.2 million, T-3:58,000, Ocx:14,000, Source: Gartner/Dataquest 
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for the duration of the connection. Therefore, 162 (= 1.544 Mbps/56 Kbps * 6) users can access 
the Internet simultaneously at one time.  
(3) Peak load time is used to calculate the Internet traffic capacity; the standard duration of peaks in 
the industry is assumed to be 4 hours a day. If we assume the average holding time per user is 30 
minutes, the number of users using the Internet during 4 peak hours is 1,296 users 
(=162*(4hrs*60 min/30 min)). From a network-engineering point of view, IAPs try to plan to 
have at least 20% excess capacity at their peak times, and therefore 1,000 BE subscribers per T1 
line is reasonable number. 
(4) It is assumed that the value of the equipment66 (cc) is $9,000, which comes from the retail price of 
an access router, a server, and 100 modems in 2001. The value of transit cost67 (ct) is assumed to 
be $1,000. The operation cost (co) per subscriber is assumed to be $1. In summary, the IAP will 
spend $10,000 of capital and transit costs for the first (1,000 – 1) subscribers before it start its 
business and it will spend $1 for every subscriber. When the IAP has a plan for network capacity 
to support up to (2,000 – 1) users, the IAP will spend $20,000 (=2*$10,000) for the costs of 
capital and interconnection. Therefore,  $10,000 can be viewed as a lump sum cost which is 
independent of number of customers within the network capacity. 
 
5.7.2 Cost of QoS-IAP 
The operation cost for QoS is assumed to be exponential. Comparing the BE, there might be a lots of 
operational works for the QoS-IAP such as (1) classification of traffic, (2) monitoring QoS measurement 
like delay, jitter, packet loss rate, and (3) complicated billing by multi-dimensions such as time, class, 
destination. We assume that the complexity of QoS operation will increase exponentially as the number of 
subscribers increases. There is a difference in operation cost with different QoS pricing: (q1QoS)^1.5 is 
used for the QoS-IAP with the flat-rate pricing and (q2QoS)^1.6 is used for the QoS-IAP with the two-part 
tariff. Since the usage-sensitive pricing has more complicated (and therefore more costly) measurement 
and billing functions than the flat-rate pricing, we assign powers of 1.6 for the two-part tariff and 1.5 for 
the flat-rate pricing for the operation cost functions. These numbers are chosen after testing several others 
considering a reasonable range of variables and profits. 
 
For capital cost of the QoS-IAP, since currently68 QoS is not supported by an access layer router, a 
distribution layer router with DiffServ capability ($10,000) is needed for QoS service and the distribution 
                                                 
66 A low-end access router  ($3,000) + a low-end mail server with software  ($3,000) + 100 Modems ($3000) 
67 The average price of T1 transit service is $1,288 per month (www.ispworld.com/isp). The big IBP’s price of T1 is 
close to $2,000 per month and small provider’s T1 price is less than $1,000 per month. 
68 At the time of data acquisition (2001) 
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layer router has an enough capability to support 5,000 subscribers. The QoS-IAP also needs server 
($3000) and 100-modem pool ($3000) by every 1,000 subscribers. However, the QoS-IAP does not worry 
about the capital cost for the BE service because QoS equipment produces BE as well as QoS. As a transit 
cost of QoS-IAP, two T1 lines are assumed to support 1,000 QoS subscribers for guaranteed service, 
which costs $2,000. The reason to use twice numbers of T1 lines for QoS service comes from the 
previous assumption that the quality ratio between BE and QoS is 1/2, i.e., MBE = 1 and MQoS = 2. 
 
5.7.3 Cost of Peering 
In the case of peering, we replace the transit cost for peering cost. For BE-IAPs’ peering, they need at 
least one distribution layer router ($10,000) to connect both access routers, which will be taken charge of 
equally ($5,000 per IAP) and they need T1 lines to connect each other. The number of T1 lines in the 
peering arrangement is determined by maximum network capacity between the two IAPs, i.e., Max {k1, 
k2} because a peering IAP has to take care of the other’s traffic as well as its own traffic. For example, if 
the IAP1 has 2K network capacity and the IAP2 has 1K network capacity, both IAPs need two T1 lines to 
support both customers’ traffic. The leased T1 price is assumed to be $150 in the local market69.  
Figure 5-4 shows the BE-peering structure. 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 5-4] BE-Peering 
 
For QoS-IAPs’ peering cost, since they already have distribution-layer routers, they only need T1 lines to 
support both IAP’s customers’ traffic. For guaranteeing service, they need two T1 lines per 1,000 users, 
which costs 2* Max {k1, k2}*$150. Figure 5-5 shows the QoS-peering structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 5-5] QoS-Peering 
                                                 
69 The T1 price is based on mileage from the CO or POP. For example, Bell South charges $80/month for the first 
half mile, and $30/month for each additional half mile. Advent of business DSL service makes the price of T1 down 
to $150/mont flat rate in the local market. (www.teleconnect.com/article/TCM20000509S0037)  
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Table 5-4 summarizes cost functions of the IAP1 used in the game model. The same cost function is 
applied to the IAP2. 
 
[Table 5-4] Cost Functions 
Category Parameter BE-IAP QoS-IAP  
(flat-rate pricing) 
QoS-IAP  
(two-part tariff) 
Capital cc / 1,000 
subscribers 
k1*9,000 10,000+ k1*6,000 10,000+ k1*6,000 
Transit ct  / 1,000 
subscribers 
k1*1,000 k1*$2,000 k1*2,000 Inter- 
conne-
ction Peering cp  / 1,000 
subscribers 
Max{k1,k2}*150 2*Max{k1,k2}*150 2*Max{k1,k2}*150 
Operation 
 
co / subscriber $1*q1BE $1*q1BE +(q1QoS)^1.5 $1*q1BE +(q1QoS)^1.6 
Transit $1*q1BE+k1*10,000 $1*q1BE +(q1QoS)^1.5 
+10,000+k1*8000 
$1*q1BE +(q1QoS)^1.6 
+10,000+n1*8000 
 
 
Total Peering $1*q1BE+5,000 
+k1*6,000 
+Max{k1,k2}*150 
$1*q1BE +(q1QoS)^1.5 
+10,000+k1*6000+ 
2*Max{k1,k2}*150 
$1*q1BE+(q1QoS)^1.6 
+10,000+k1*6000+ 
2*Max{k1,k2}*150 
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[CHAPTER 6] ANALYSIS OF UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION 
According to the demand function based on the uniform distribution, we make 10 cases with a 
combination of three strategies, (1) technology choice, (2) pricing scheme, and (3) interconnection 
method. Each IAP has three investment options for its network capacity, 1K, 2K, or 3K. The first 6 cases, 
i.e., Case 1 ~ Case 6, are related to transit interconnection and the remaining 4 cases, i.e., Case 7 ~ Case 
10, are related to peering interconnection. We analyze Case 1 in detail as a sample case. The rest of the 
cases are explained focusing on the results since all use a similar methodology. In the end, we present 
overall analysis of this game model and social welfare analysis.  
 
6.1 Analysis of Case 1 
In this case, both IAPs choose (1) BE service, (2) transit, and (3) flat-rate pricing. The profit functions of 
two IAPs are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE]+8) – (q1BE+k1*10000), if 0 < q1BE < k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE] = q2BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE]+8) – (q2BE+k2*10000), if 0 < q2BE < k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE), and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3.  
 
We assumed that each IAP maximizes profit for any number of subscribers that the other IAP is able to 
serve. This means that the maximum of the functions in f1[q1BE, q2BE] and f2[q1BE, q2BE] have to be 
obtained with respect to q1BE and q2BE. Since the profit functions are different according to the investment 
level, the maximization has to be obtained within each network capacity. This is done using the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for maximization with inequality constraints.  
 
Using the first order conditions for the maximization of each IAP’s profit function with the assumption 
that the number of subscribers of the other IAP is fixed, we obtain a system of two equations and two 
unknowns. The maximization values of q1BE and q2BE are obtained solving this system of equations.  
 
If we solve the above the two profit functions simultaneously without constraints, the equilibrium 
quantities are: 
q1*BE = q2*BE  = 1,900 subscribers 
with reaction functions of  q1BE = -50*(-57+ q2BE /100) and q2BE = -50*(-57+ q1BE /100). The following 
graph shows two reaction functions: (1) R1[q2BE] = 2850 – 0.5*q2BE, and (2) R2[q1BE] = 2850 – 0.5*q1BE.  
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[Figure 6-1] Reaction Functions 
These two reaction functions satisfy the stability condition of the Cournot model, which is ∂qi/∂qj < 1. 
In our reaction functions this value is ∂q1BE /∂q2BE  = 0.5. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium quantity 
exists in the Case 1. The intersection point of two reaction functions is an equilibrium, (q1*BE, q2*BE) = 
(1900, 1900). However, that equilibrium is only meaningful when k1 > 2 and k2 > 2, because 1,900 is 
only available when the network capacity is up to 1999 subscribers or higher.  
 
We use Lagrangian function to maximize the two profit functions simultaneously with inequality 
constraints. For example, when k1= k2 = 1, i.e., network capacity of [1K, 1K], the inequalities, (0 < q1BE 
< 1,000) and (0 < q2BE < 1,000) are the same as (0 < q1BE < 999) and (0 < q2BE < 999) because q1BE and 
q2BE must be an integer.  We use slack (dummy) variables, n12 and n22 and Lagrangian multipliers, r1 and 
r2, for the purpose of transforming the inequality conditions into equation form and satisfying non-
negativity condition. The followings are input equations of the Mathematica to solve the Case 1 with 
network capacity of [1K, 1K].  
 
 [1] pbe[q1be_, q2be_] = 50 – 0.01*(q1be+q2be)  /* Inverse BE demand function */ 
 [2] f1[q1be_,q2be_] = q1be*(pbe[q1be,q2be]+8)-(q1be+1*1000)  
 /* Profit function of IAP1 with k1=1*/ 
 [3] f2[q1be_,q2be_] = q2be*(pbe[q1be,q2be]+8)-(q2be+1*1000)  
 /* Profit function of IAP2 with k2=1*/ 
 [4] c1[q1be_] = q1be + n1^2 – 999  
 /* Capacity constraint of IAP1 and non-negative constraint of q1be*/ 
 [5] c2[q2be_] = q2be + n2^2 – 999  
 /* Capacity constraint of IAP2 and non-negative constraint of q2be*/ 
 [6] g1[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_]=Simplify[Expand[f1[q1be,q2be]+r1*c1[q1be]]] 
  q1 = R1(q2) 
 
  q2 = R2(q1) 
q1/q2
q2/q1 
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 /* Lagrangian function of IAP1, r1: Largrangian multiplier */ 
 [7] g2[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_]=Simplify[Expand[f2[q1be,q2be]+r2*c2[q1be]]] 
 /* Lagrangian function of IAP2, r2: Largrangian multiplier */ 
 [8] g1q1be[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] =  
  Simplify[Expand[D[g1[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],q1be]]] 
 [9] g1r1[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] = Simplify[Expand[D[g1[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],r1]]] 
 [10] g1n1[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] = Simplify[Expand[D[g1[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],n1]]] 
 /* First order conditions of IAP1 with respect to q1be, r1, n1 */ 
 [11] g1n1v1[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,v1_,v2_] = g1n1[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,(999-q1be),n2] 
 /* To reduce the number of variables, the variable v1 (=999-q1be) is used */ 
 [12] g2q2be[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] =  
  Simplify[Expand[D[g2[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],q2be]]] 
 [13] g2r2[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] = Simplify[Expand[D[g2[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],r2]]] 
 [14] g2n2[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,n1_,n2_] = Simplify[Expand[D[g2[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2],n2]]] 
 /* First order conditions of IAP2 with respect to q2be, r2, n2 */ 
 [15] g2n2v2[q1be_,q2be_,r1_,r2_,v1_,v2_] = g2n2[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,(999-q2be)] 
 /* To reduce the number of variable, the variable v2 (=999-q2be) is used */ 
 [16] sol = Simplify[Expand[Flatten[Nsolve[{g1q1be[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2] ==0, 
           g1n1v1[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,v1,v2] ==0, g2q2be[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,n1,n2]==0, 
                 g2n2v2[q1be,q2be,r1,r2,v1,v2] ==0}, {q1be,q2be,r1,r2}]]]]  
 /* Solve four first-order conditions simultaneously with respect to q1be, q2be, r1, r2 */ 
  
From the input equation [16], we can get an equilibrium solution: (q1*BE, q2* BE, r1*, r2*) = (999, 999, -
27.03, -27.03). The profit of each IAP (=f1*, f2*) is $26,983 and the equilibrium price (=p*BE) is $30.02. 
With a change in the capacity constraint, i.e., [k1K, k2K], and its profit function, we get the following 
nine equilibria in Case 1.  
[Table 6-1] Equilibrium Points of Case 1 
Case 1 q1*BE q2*BE f1* f2* P*BE 
[1K,1K] 999 999 26983 26983 30.02 
[1K,2K] 999 1999 16993 34013 20.02 
[1K,3K] 999 2350 13486 25249 16.51 
[2K,1K] 1999 999 34013 16993 20.02 
[2K,2K] 1900 1900 16100 16100 12.00 
[2K,3K] 1900 1900 16100 6100 12.00 
[3K,1K] 2350 999 25249 13486 16.51 
[3K,2K] 1900 1900 6100 16100 12.00 
[3K,3K] 1900 1900 6100 6100 12.00 
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The following table is a payoff matrix of Case 1, which is based on the above table. Table 6-2 is 
symmetric along the diagonal where both IAPs’ profits are the same. 
 
[Table 6-2] Payoff Matrix for Case 1 
IAP1             IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [26983, 26983] [16993, 34013] [13486, 25249] 2K 
2K [34013, 16993] [16100, 16100] [16100, 6100] 1K 
3K [25249, 13486] [6100, 16100] [6100, 6100] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 2K   
 
We try to find an equilibrium strategy of network capacity among the above nine cells, i.e., an optimal 
k1* and k2*. There are two equilibria in the matrix, [1K, 2K] and [2K, 1K]. We only consider four shaded 
cells instead of all nine cells, because 3K is always inferior to 2K.  
• If IAP1 chooses 1K, IAP2’s optimal strategy is 2K, because (f2[999,999] = $26,983) < 
(f2[999,1999] = $34,013).  
• If IAP1 chooses 2K, IAP2’s optimal strategy is 1K because (f2[1999,999] = $16,993) > 
(f2[1900,1900] = $16,100).  
The same logic can be applied to the IAP2.  
• If IAP2 chooses 1K, IAP1’s optimal strategy is 2K because (f1[999,999] = $26,983) < 
(f1[1999,999] = $34,013).  
• If IAP2 chooses 2K, IAP1’s optimal strategy is 1K because (f1[999,1999] = $16,9893) > 
(f1[1900,1900] = $16,100).  
At these equilibrium points, either IAP cannot produce higher profit to change its own strategy. In this 
case, being a larger network capacity (2K) earlier than the other (1K) will pay off. 
 
6.2 Analysis of Case 2 
In this case, IAP1 chooses BE and IAP2 chooses QoS as its technology. Both IAPs’ interconnection 
strategies are transit and they use flat-rate pricing for their services. In this case, IAP2 is a monopoly 
provider of QoS service. The profit functions of the two IAPs are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+k1*10000), if 0 < q1BE < 
k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS] = q2BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+8) + q2QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+8) – 
(q2BE+ q2QoS^1.5+10000+k2*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+q2QoS), 
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+(50 – 0.01*q2QoS), and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3. 
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With adding a new variable (q2QoS), we solve the above equations by the same approach as we did in the 
Case 1. The following table displays quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium point of each 
investment in the network capacity. 
 
[Table 6-3] Equilibrium Points of Case 2 
Case 2 q1*BE q2* BE Q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P* BE P*QoS
[1K,1K] 999 354 645 999 999 26983 31337 30.02 73.57
[1K,2K] 999 1354 645 999 1999 16993 40367 20.02 63.57
[1K,3K] 999 1705 645 999 2350 13487 33602 16.51 60.06
[2K,1K] 1999 354 645 1999 999 52013 21347 20.02 63.57
[2K,2K] 1900 1255 645 1900 1900 16100 22454 12.00 55.55
[2K,3K] 1900 1255 645 1900 1900 16100 14454 12.00 55.55
[3K,1K] 2350 354 645 2350 999 25249 17840 16.51 60.06
[3K,2K] 1900 1255 645 1900 1900 6100 22454 12 55.55
[3K,3K] 1900 1255 645 1900 1900 6100 14454 12 55.55
     * Q1 = q1BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. The equilibrium network capacity is [1K, 
2K], where IAP2 has larger network capacity and a higher profit than IAP1. This result implies that a 
QoS-IAP will have a better market position than a BE-IAP when they exist in the same market and 
upgrading to QoS technology earlier than the other will pay off. 
 
[Table 6-4] Payoff Matrix for Case 2 
IAP1             IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k*2 
1K [26983, 31337] [16993, 40367] [13487, 33602] 2K 
2K [52013, 21347] [16100, 22454] [16100, 14454] 2K 
3K [25249, 17840] [6100, 22454] [6100, 14454] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 2K   
 
The following graph shows the IAP2’s pricing structure at the network capacity of [1K, 2K]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
[Figure 6-2] Pricing Structure of QoS-IAP in Case 2 
PBE = 
$20.02 
PQoS =  
$63.57 
Q (Usage Hours) 
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6.3 Analysis of Case 3 
In this case, every strategy is the same as Case 2 except for the pricing scheme of IAP2, i.e., two-part 
tariff. The profit function of IAP1 is the same as in Case 2. The profit functions of the two IAPs are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS, r]+8) – (q1BE+k1*10000), if 0 < q1BE < 
k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS, r] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS, r]+8) +hQoS[r]*r*q2QoS – (q2BE+ 
q2QoS^1.6+10000+k2*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS, r]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+q2QoS) – 5*r,  
hQoS[r]=100- 33.3*r, and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3. 
 
In this case, there are four variables, q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS, and r. We use the same approach as we did in the 
previous case, but the solution in this case is imaginary. As the next best method, we try to solve this case 
with three variables (q1BE, q2BE, and q2QoS) with a constant value of r. We modify the above profit 
functions into the followings: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+k1*10000), if 0 < q1BE < 
k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q2QoS – (q2BE+ 
q2QoS^1.6+10000+k2*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+q2QoS) – 5*r,  
hQoS=100- 33.3*r, k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3, and r = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, …, or 2.0.  
 
We maximize the above two equations 11 times, each time with different pair of (r, hQoS), i.e., {($1.0, 67), 
($1.1, 63), ($1.2, 60), ($1.3, 57), ($1.4, 53), ($1.5, 50), ($1.6, 47), ($1.7, 43), ($1.8, 40), ($1.9, 37), ($2.0, 
33)}. Experience gives us an optimal range of ‘r’, which lies between 1.0 and 2.0. We use an integer 
number of QoS connection hours based on the equation of hQoS=100- 33.3*r. For example, at first, put r = 
$1.0 /hour and hQoS =67 hours into the above equations and solve them simultaneously. And next, put r = 
$1.1 /hour and hQoS =63 hours into the above equations and solve them simultaneously. Do the same thing 
until r = 2.0 /hour and hQoS =33 hours. And compare the eleven equilibrium outputs and find a maximum 
profit of IAP2 among them. For example, in the following table, there are eleven equilibrium points in the 
network capacity of [1K, 1K]. Among them, r =$1.3 /hour and hQoS =57 hours give the maximum profit to 
the IAP2. We use this modified method when at least one of IAPs chooses the two-part tariff, i.e., Case 3, 
4, 6, 8, and 10. 
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[Table 6-5] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and profits with a change of r 
r q1* BE q2*BE q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P* BE 
1.0 999 481 518 999 999 21988 27186 25.02 
1.1 999 452 547 999 999 21489 27911 24.52 
1.2 999 416 583 999 999 20989 28937 24.02 
1.3 999 388 611 999 999 20490 29690 23.52 
1.4 999 387 612 999 999 19990 29252 23.02 
1.5 999 376 623 999 999 19491 29246 22.52 
1.6 999 373 626 999 999 18991 28871 22.02 
1.7 999 402 597 999 999 18492 27088 21.52 
1.8 999 416 583 999 999 17992 25940 21.02 
1.9 999 439 560 999 999 17493 24469 20.52 
2.0 999 494 505 999 999 1693 21680 20.02 
* Q1 = q1BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table shows IAP2’s best r value of each investment level in Case 3. Except for the network 
capacity of [3K, 1K] the best r values of all other network capacities appear to be $1.3 /hour.  
 
[Table 6-6] Best r of Case 3 
IAP1     IAP2 1K 2K 3K 
1K 1.3 1.3 1.3 
2K 1.3 1.3 1.3 
3K 1.5 1.3 1.3 
   
According to the above best r values, the following table is quantities, prices, and profits at the 
equilibrium point of each investment on the network capacity. 
 
[Table 6-7] Equilibrium Points of Case 3 
Case 3 r q1* BE q2* BE q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P* BE 
[1K,1K] 1.3 999 388 611 999 999 20490 29690 23.52 
[1K,2K] 1.3 999 1388 611 999 1999 10500 32220 13.52 
[1K,3K] 1.3 999 1415 611 999 2026 10230 24227 13.25 
[2K,1K] 1.3 1999 388 611 1999 999 21020 19700 13.52 
[2K,2K] 1.3 1683 1073 611 1683 1684 8325 19542 9.83 
[2K,3K] 1.3 1683 1073 611 1683 1684 8325 11542 9.83 
[3K,1K] 1.5 1976 376 623 1976 999 9026 19486 12.75 
[3K,2K] 1.3 1683 1073 611 1683 1684 -1675 19542 9.83 
[3K,3K] 1.3 1683 1073 611 1683 1684 -1675 11542 9.83 
              * Q1 = q1BE  and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
 58 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. There are two equilibrium points in this 
case: [1K, 2K] and [2K, 1K]. This result implies that even a BE-IAP can have a better market position 
when it chooses larger network capacity than a QoS-IAP with two-part tariff. If we compare tables 6-3 
and 6-7, equilibrium profits in Case 2 are higher than those in Case 3 at the network capacity of [1K, 2K]. 
In conclusion, when competing with a BE-IAP, flat-rate pricing is the superior QoS pricing scheme to the 
two-part tariff. 
[Table 6-8] Payoff Matrix for Case 3 
IAP1          IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [20490,29690] [10500,32220] [10230,24227] 2K 
2K [21020,19700] [8325,19542] [8325,11542] 1K 
3K [9026,19486] [-1675,19542] [-1675,11542] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K  
 
The following figure shows the IAP2’s pricing structure at the network capacity of [1K, 2K]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 6-3] Pricing Structure of QoS-IAP in the Case 3 
 
6.4 Analysis of Case 4 
In this case, both IAPs choose QoS with different pricing schemes: IAP1 with flat-rate pricing and IAP2 
with two-part tariff. Both IAPs choose transit for their interconnection. The following are the modified 
profit functions of the two IAPs with constant r. 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q1QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+ q1QoS^1.5+10000+k1*8000), if 0 < (q1BE + q1QoS) < k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q2QoS – 
(q2BE+ q2QoS^1.6+10000+k2*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS) < k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS)-5*r,  
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS,  q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+50 – 0.01*(q1QoS+q2QoS),  
hQoS=100- 33.3*r, k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3, and r = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, …, or 2.0. 
 
PBE= 
$13.52 
Q (Usage Hours) 
r = $1.3/hr
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The following table is quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium of each investment in network 
capacity. QoS market demand (=q1*QoS+q2*QoS) is relatively stable regardless of network capacity and 
QoS-IAP with tow-part tariff has a more market share than QoS-IAP with flat-rate. (q1*QoS<q2*QoS) 
  
[Table 6-9] Equilibrium Points of Case 4 
Case 4 r q1* BE q2*BE q1* QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P*BE P* QoS
[1K,1K] 1.3 474 388 525 611 999 999 21272 29690 23.53 62.16 
[1K,2K] 1.3 474 1388 525 611 999 1999 11281 32220 13.52 52.16 
[1K,3K] 1.3 474 1415 525 611 999 2026 11012 24227 13.25 51.89 
[2K,1K] 1.3 1474 388 525 611 1999 999 23801 19700 13.52 52.16 
[2K,2K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1684 11107 19542 9.83 48.47 
[2K,3K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1757 11107 11542 9.83 48.47 
[3K,1K] 1.5 1452 376 523 623 1975 999 13745 19496 12.76 51.30 
[3K,2K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1757 3107 19542 9.83 48.47 
[3K,3K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1757 3107 11542 9.83 48.47 
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. In this case, there are also two 
equilibrium points: [1K, 2K] where QoS-IAP with a two-part tariff has a higher profit and [2K, 1K] 
where QoS-IAP with flat-rate has a higher profit. This result implies that larger QoS-IAP will be a better 
market position regardless of pricing scheme.  
 
[Table 6-10] Payoff Matrix for Case 4 
IAP1    IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [21272,29690] [11281,32220] [11012,24227] 2K 
2K [23801,19700] [11107,19542] [11107,11542] 1K 
3K [13745,19496] [3107,19542] [3107,11542] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 2K  
 
6.5 Analysis of Case 5 
In this case, both IAPs choose QoS with flat-rate pricing. The profit functions of the two IAPs are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q1QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+ q1QoS^1.5+10000+k1*8000), if 0 < (q1BE + q1QoS)< k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q2BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q2QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q2BE+ q2QoS^1.5+10000+k1*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS),  
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS,  q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+50 – 0.01*(q1QoS+q2QoS) ,  
and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3. 
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The following table is quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium points of each investment in the 
network capacity. QoS market share of both IAPs are equal and constant regardless of network capacity. 
Therefore, market share of BE service determines the overall profit of both IAPs. 
 
[Table 6-11] Equilibrium Points of Case 5 
Case 5 q1*BE q2* BE q1*QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p*BE p *QoS
[1K,1K] 460 460 539 539 999 999 28148 28148 30.02 69.24
[1K,2K] 460 1460 539 539 999 1999 18158 37178 20.02 59.24
[1K,3K] 460 1811 539 539 999 2350 14651 30414 16.51 55.73
[2K,1K] 1460 460 539 539 1999 999 37178 18158 20.02 59.24
[2K,2K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 19265 19265 12.00 51.22
[2K,3K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 19265 11265 12.00 51.22
[3K,1K] 1811 460 539 539 2350 999 30414 14651 16.51 55.74
[3K,2K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 11265 19265 12.00 51.22
[3K,3K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 11265 11265 12.00 51.22
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. Both IAPs’ dominant strategy is 2K, 
therefore there is one equilibrium, [2K, 2K]. At this equilibrium, every strategy is symmetric between two 
IAPs, i.e., the same strategy set of two IAPs, {QoS, flat-rate, 2K, transit}. So, there is a possibility of 
collusion between the two identical providers, i.e., to reduce the network capacity from 2K to 1K, and to 
get a higher profit than at the equilibrium point. (f1[1K, 1K] = f2[1K, 1K] = 28,148 > f1[2K, 2K] = f2[2K, 
2K] = 19,265). In the Cournot model, market quantity determines the market price of a product. Reducing 
market quantity means (1) increasing the market price and (2) reducing cost. Even though output of the 
product decreases, profit would rise because of the increased price and the decreased cost. 
 
[Table 6-12] Payoff Matrix for Case 5 
IAP1           IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [28148, 28148] [18185, 37178] [14651, 30414] 2K 
2K [37178, 18158] [19265, 19265] [19265, 11265] 2K 
3K [30414, 14651] [11265, 19265] [11265, 11265] 2K 
Optimal  k1* 2K 2K 2K  
 
6.6 Analysis of Case 6 
In this case, both IAPs choose the QoS with two-part tariff. The profit functions of two IAPs are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q1BE+q1QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + hQoS*r*q1QoS – 
(q1BE+ q1QoS^1.6+10000+k1*8000), if 0 < (q1BE + q1QoS)< k1*1000, 
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• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q2QoS – 
(q2BE+ q2QoS^1.6+10000+k2*8000), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS) – 5*r,  
hQoS=100- 33.3*r, k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3, and r = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, …, or 2.0. 
 
The following table is quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium point of each investment in the 
network capacity. In this case, QoS market share of both IAPs are equal and BE market shares determine 
the overall profits of both IAPs. 
[Table 6-13] Equilibrium Points of Case 6 
Case 6 r q1*BE q2*BE q1*QoS q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P*BE
[1K,1K] 1.3 388 388 611 611 999 999 29690 29690 23.53
[1K,2K] 1.3 388 1388 611 611 999 1999 19700 32220 13.52
[1K,3K] 1.3 388 1415 611 611 999 2026 19430 24227 13.25
[2K,1K] 1.3 1388 388 611 611 1999 999 32220 19700 13.52
[2K,2K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 19525 19525 9.82
[2K,3K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 19525 11525 9.82
[3K,1K] 1.5 1353 376 623 623 1976 999 22782 19486 12.75
[3K,2K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 11525 19525 9.82
[3K,3K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 11525 11525 9.82
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. There are two equilibra in this case: [1K, 
2K] and [2K, 1K]. It concludes that when both IAPs produce QoS services with a two-part tariff, large 
QoS-IAP will pay off. 
[Table 6-14] Payoff Matrix for Case 6 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [29690,29690] [19700,32220] [19430,24227] 2K 
2K [32220,19700] [19525,19525] [19525,11525] 1K 
3K [22782,19486] [11525,19525] [11525,11525] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K   
 
6.7 Analysis of Case 7 
Cases 7, 8, 9, and 10 are related to the peering of the two IAPs. In Case 7 both IAPs are BE-IAPs and in 
the other cases they are QoS-IAPs. The payoff functions of the Case 7 are:  
• f1[q1BE, q2BE] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE]+8) – (q1BE+k1*9000) – (0.5*10000+max{k1,k2}*150), if 
0 < q1BE < k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE] = q2BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE]+8) – (q2BE+k2*9000) – (0.5*10000+ max{k1,k2}*150), if 
0 < q2BE < k2*1000, 
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where pBE[q1BE, q2BE]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE), and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3. 
 
The following table shows quantities, price, and profits at the equilibrium point of each investment in the 
network capacity.  
[Table 6-15] Equilibrium Points of Case 7 
Case 7 q1* BE q2* BE f1* f2* P* BE 
[1K,1K] 999 999 22833 22833 30.02 
[1K,2K] 999 1999 12693 30713 20.02 
[1K,3K] 999 2350 9036 22799 16.51 
[2K,1K] 1999 999 30713 12693 20.02 
[2K,2K] 1900 1900 12800 12800 12.00 
[2K,3K] 1900 1900 12650 3650 12.00 
[3K,1K] 2350 999 22799 9036 16.51 
[3K,2K] 1900 1900 3650 12650 12.00 
[3K,3K] 1900 1900 3650 3650 12.00 
 
The following is a payoff matrix based on the above table. 2K is a dominant strategy of both IAPs so, 
there is one equilibrium, [2K, 2K]. At the equilibrium, strategy sets of two IAPs’ are identical, i.e., {BE, 
flat-rate, 2K, peering} and they have to cooperate closely under the peering arrangement. There is a 
strong possibility for them to collude by cutting their investment level from 2K to 1K; then they can 
obtain a higher profit than at their equilibrium point. At the point of [1K, 1K], the profit of each IAP is 
the same as a half of monopoly profit, which means both IAP can produce a half of monopoly quantity70 
and divide the monopoly profits equally. 
 
[Table 6-16] Payoff Matrix for Case 7 
IAP1       IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [22833,22833] [12693,30713] [9036,22799] 2K 
2K [30713,12693] [12800,12800] [12650,3650] 2K 
3K [22799,9036] [3650,12650] [3650,3650] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 2K 2K  
 
In Case 1 and Case 7, both IAP provide BE service to the market. If we compare tables 6-1 and 6-15, 
equilibrium quantities and prices at each investment level are the same in the both cases. The only 
difference between the two tables is the equilibrium profit of each investment level because of different 
cost structure; the equilibrium profits in Case 7 are lower than those in Case 1. In conclusion, because of 
relatively heavy capital cost, BE-IAPs in Case 1 do not have a motivation to make a peering arrangement 
to move to the Case 7. 
                                                 
70 A monopoly IAP can produce 1,999 with 2K of network capacity. 
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6.8 Analysis of Case 8 
This case is the same as the Case 4 except for peering instead of transit, i.e., both choose QoS with 
difference pricing scheme and decide to make QoS peering arrangement. The followings are the profit 
functions of both IAPs: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q1QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+ q1QoS^1.5+10000+k1*6000) –(max{k1,k2}*150*2), if 0 < (q1BE + 
q1QoS)< k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q2QoS – 
(q2BE+ q2QoS^1.6+10000+k2*6000) – (max{k1,k2}*150*2), if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS)-5*r,  
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS,  q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+50 – 0.01*(q1QoS+q2QoS) ,  
hQoS=100- 33.3*r, k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3, and r = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, …, or 2.0. 
 
The following table shows quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium point of each investment in the 
network capacity.  
[Table 6-17] Equilibrium Points of Case 8 
Case 8 r q1*BE q2*BE q1*QoS q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p*BE p*QoS
[1K, 1K] 1.3 474 388 525 611 999 999 22971 31390 23.52 62.16
[1K, 2K] 1.3 474 1388 525 611 999 1999 12681 35620 13.52 52.16
[1K, 3K] 1.3 474 1415 525 611 999 2026 12111 29327 13.25 51.89
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1474 388 525 611 1999 999 27201 21100 13.52 52.16
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1684 14507 22942 9.83 48.47
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1684 14207 16642 9.83 48.47
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1452 376 523 623 1975 999 18845 20596 12.76 51.3
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1684 8207 22642 9.83 48.47
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1158 1073 525 611 1683 1684 8207 16642 9.83 48.47
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following table is a payoff matrix based on the above table. [2K, 2K] is an equilibrium strategy of 
network capacity. At this point, even though they make an investment of the same network capacity, 
QoS-IAP with two-part tariff has a higher profit than QoS-IAP with flat-rate pricing. 
 
[Table 6-18] Payoff Matrix for Case 8  
 IAP1       IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [22971,31390] [12681,35620] [12111,29327] 2K 
2K [27201,21100] [14507,22942] [14207,11642] 2K 
3K [18845,20596] [8207,22642] [8207,16642] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 2K 2K   
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6.9 Analysis of Case 9 
In this case, every strategy is the same as the Case 5 except for peering instead of transit. Both IAP 
choose the QoS with the flat-rate pricing. The profit functions are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q1BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q1QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q1BE+ q1QoS^1.5+10000+k1*6000) – max{k1,k2}*150*2, if 0 < (q1BE + 
q1QoS)< k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = q2BE*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) + q2QoS*(pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, 
q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) – (q2BE+ q2QoS^1.5+10000+k1*6000) – max{k1,k2}*150*2, if 0 < (q2BE + 
q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS),  
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS,  q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+50 – 0.01*(q1QoS+q2QoS) ,  
and k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3. 
 
The following table shows quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium point of each investment in the 
network capacity. QoS market share of both IAPs are same and constant regardless of network capacity, 
so the market shares of BE service determine profits of both IAPs. Compared to table 6-11, every thing is 
same except for equilibrium profits, which is caused by the different cost structures between peering and 
transit. If we take a careful look at the equilibrium tables of cases 1, 5, 7, and 9, where both IAPs choose 
flat-rate, since QoS users are also BE users total market shares of each IAP (Q1, Q2) is always same.  
 
[Table 6-19] Equilibrium Points of Case 9 
Case 9 q1*BE q2*BE q1*QoS q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P*BE P*QoS
[1K,1K] 460 460 539 539 999 999 29848 29848 30.02 69.24
[1K,2K] 460 1460 539 539 999 1999 19558 40578 20.02 59.24
[1K,3K] 460 1811 539 539 999 2350 15751 35514 16.51 55.73
[2K,1K] 1460 460 539 539 1999 999 40578 19558 20.02 59.24
[2K,2K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 22665 22665 12.00 51.22
[2K,3K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 22365 16365 12.00 51.22
[3K,1K] 1811 460 539 539 2350 999 35514 15751 16.51 55.73
[3K,2K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 16365 22365 12.00 51.22
[3K,3K] 1361 1361 539 539 1900 1900 16365 16365 12.00 51.22
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following is a payoff matrix based on the above table. 2K is a dominant strategy of both IAPs and 
[2K, 2K] is an equilibrium strategy of this case, where both IAPs have an identical strategy set.  
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[Table 6-20] Payoff Matrix for Case 9 
IAP1    IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [29848,29848] [19558,40578] [15751,35514] 2K 
2K [40578,19558] [22665,22665] [22365,16365] 2K 
3K [35514,15751] [16365,22365] [16365,16365] 2K 
Optimal  k1* 2K 2K 2K  
 
6.10 Analysis of Case 10 
This case is the same as the Case 6 except for peering instead of transit. Both IAPs choose QoS with two-
part tariff. The profit functions are: 
• f1[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q1BE+q1QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q1QoS – 
(q1BE+ q1QoS^1.6+10000+k1*6000) – max{k1,k2}*150*2, if 0 < (q1BE + q1QoS)< k1*1000, 
• f2[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS] = (q2BE+q2QoS)*(pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+8) +hQoS*r*q2QoS – 
(q2BE+ q2QoS^1.6+10000+k1*6000) – max{k1,k2}*150*2, if 0 < (q2BE + q2QoS)< k2*1000, 
where pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]=50 – 0.01*(q1 BE+q2BE+ q1QoS+q2QoS) – 5*r,  
pQoS[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS,  q2QoS]= pBE[q1BE, q2BE, q1QoS, q2QoS]+50 – 0.01*(q1QoS+q2QoS),   
hQoS=100- 33.3*r, k1, k2 = 1, 2, or 3, and r = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, …, or 2.0.. 
 
The following table is quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium point of each investment in the 
network capacity. Comparing Case 6 and Case 10, where both QoS-IAPs choose a two-part tariff, 
everything is same except for the equilibrium profits. 
  
[Table 6-21] Equilibrium Points of Case 10 
Case 10 r q1*BE q2*BE q1*QoS q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p*BE
[1K, 1K] 1.3 388 388 611 611 999 999 31390 31390 23.52
[1K, 2K] 1.3 388 1388 611 611 999 1999 21100 35620 13.52
[1K, 3K] 1.3 388 1415 611 611 999 2026 20530 29327 13.25
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1388 388 611 611 1999 999 35620 21100 13.52
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 22925 22925 9.82
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 22625 16625 9.82
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1353 376 623 623 1976 999 27882 20586 12.75
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 16625 22625 9.82
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1073 1073 611 611 1684 1684 16625 16625 9.82
* Q1 = q1BE  + q2BE and Q2 = q2BE + q2QoS 
 
The following is a payoff matrix based on the above table. 2K is a dominant strategy for both IAPs and 
[2K, 2K] is an equilibrium strategy of this case, where both IAPs have an identical strategy set.  
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[Table 6-22] Payoff Matrix for Case 10 
 IAP1       IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [31390,31390] [21100,35620] [20530,29327] 2K 
2K [35620,21100] [22925,22925] [22625,16625] 2K 
3K [27882,20586] [16625,22625] [16625,16625] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 2K 2K   
 
All peering-QoS cases (Cases 8, 9, and 10) have an equilibrium at [2K, 2K]. The profits at [1K, 1K] in all 
three cases are higher than those at [2K, 2K]. So, all these three cases provide an incentive for the IAPs to 
reduce their investment in network capacity from 2K to 1K. 
  
If we compare the transit-QoS cases (Cases 4, 5, and 6) with the peering-QoS cases (Cases 8,9, and 10), 
the former has the same strategies as the latter except for the interconnection strategy. In detail, if we 
compare tables (1) 6-9 (Case 4) and 6-17 (Case 8), (2) 6-11 (Case 5) and 6-19 (Case 9), and (3) 6-13 
(Case 6) and 6-21 (Case 10), the equilibrium quantities and prices are the same. But the equilibrium 
profits in the peering cases are higher than those in the transit cases. So, QoS-IAPs would have an 
incentive to peer with each other. In conclusion, once IAPs upgrade their technology from BE to QoS, it 
would be better for them to make a peering arrangement.  The following table compares equilibrium 
profits of QoS-IAPs at the network capacity of [1K, 2K], [2K, 1K], and [2K, 2K] between transit and 
peering cases. 
 
[Table 6-23] Comparison of QoS Equilibrium Profits between Transit and Peering 
Transit Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
[1K, 2K] [11281, 32220] [18158,37178] [19700, 32220] 
[2K, 1K] [23801, 19700] [37178,18158] [32220, 19700] 
[2K, 2K] [11107, 19542] [19265,19265] [19525,19525] 
Peering Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 
[1K, 2K] [12681,35620] [19558, 40578] [21100,35620] 
[2K, 1K] [27201,21100] [40578,19558] [35620, 21100] 
[2K, 2K] [14507,22942] [22665,22665] [22925,22925] 
 
At their equilibrium network capacity, all peering QoS-IAPs provide 4K (= 2K + 2K) network capacity to 
the market but except for the Case 5 the other transit QoS-IAPs provide 3K (=1K + 2K) to the market. In 
conclusion, QoS-peering gives more capacity to the market at a lower price, which is desirable to the 
customers in the market. 
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6.11 Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
If we combine equilibrium points of all ten cases, we can suggest a progressive path of IAPs’ market 
equilibrium. We can classify the above ten cases into three categories: (1) current BE Internet: Case 1, (2) 
Internet in transit: Cases 2, 3, and 7, and (3) future QoS Internet: Cases 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. 
 
[Table 6-24] Current, Transitive, and Future Internet Market Classification 
Current Internet Market Internet Market in Transition Future QoS Internet Market
Case 1 Case 2, Case 3, and Case 7 Case 4~6 and Case 8~10 
BE Internet BE-Peering or Co-existence of BE and QoS QoS Internet and QoS peering 
 
From the equilibrium points in Case 1, we can find a progressive path of market equilibrium over time 
when the technology changes from BE to QoS and the interconnection method changes from transit to 
peering. The decision making rules of transition from one equilibrium to another, when a new strategy is 
introduced, are (1) whether the profit of new equilibrium point is higher than the previous one and (2) 
increasing network capacity is possible but decreasing is impossible because network capacity is assumed 
to be classified into the irreversible sunk cost. This transition is also based on the assumption that the 
other’s strategy set does not change. The following tables show two progressive paths: 
  [Table 6-25a] Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Path I Case 1 [1K, 2K] 
[16993,34013] 
Case 2 [1K, 2K] 
[16993,40367] 
Case 5 [2K, 2K] 
[19265,19265] 
Case 9 [2K, 2K] 
[22665,22665] 
Path II Case 1 [2K, 1K] 
[34013, 16993] 
Case 2 [2K, 1K] 
[21020,19700] 
Case 6 [2K, 1K] 
[32220, 19700] 
 
 
[Table 6-25b] Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
Transit Peering 
BE QoS BE QoS 
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At the equilibrium point of [1K, 2K] in Case 1, there are three possibilities to move to the next phase: (1) 
one IAP chooses QoS with a flat-rate pricing (Case 2), (2) one IAP chooses QoS with a two-part tariff 
(Case 3), and (3) both IAPs make a BE peering arrangement (Case 7). From IAP1’s point of view, all 
three options give it the same or lower profit than just staying at the current equilibrium point. However, 
if IAP2 changes its technology from BE to QoS with the same flat-rate pricing, its profit would be higher 
than the current ($34,013 ? $40,367). So, [1K, 2K] in Case 2 is the second period equilibrium. Since at 
this point IAP2’s profit is the highest among all equilibrium points in transit cases, there is no motivation 
for IAP2 to change its strategy set. However, even though IAP1 is not the first mover to QoS, if it 
changes its strategy set like {(BE? QoS), flat-rate, (1K? 2K), transit}, it will pay off ($16,993 ? 
$19,265). The third period equilibrium point is [2K, 2K] in Case 5.  At this point, there is an incentive to 
make a QoS peering arrangement between the two IAPs because of higher profits ($19,265 ? $22,665). 
So, [2K, 2K] in Case 9 is a final destination of Path I.  
 
At the equilibrium point of [2K, 1K] in Case 1, IAP2 wants to change its strategy set like {BE? QoS, 
flat-rate? two-part, 1K, transit}, which gives higher profit ($16,993 ? $19,700). So, [2K, 1K] in Case 3 
is the second period equilibrium. At this point, IAP1’s profit is reduced, so it also wants to change its 
strategy set like {BE? QoS, flat-rate? two-part, 2K, transit}, which also gives higher profit ($21,020? 
$32,220). Therefore, the third period equilibrium is [2K, 1K] in Case VI71. However, in Path II, due to its 
profit reduction72 and inequality of network capacity, IAP2 does not want to make a QoS peering 
arrangement. So, [2K 1K] in Case 6 is a final destination of Path II.  The following graph shows changes 
of profits along the two progressive paths.  
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[Figure 6-4] Equilibrium Profits of Progressive Paths 
                                                 
71 Because this payoff matrix is symmetric, another equilibrium point in Case VI, i.e., [1K, 2K] also can be a third 
period equilibrium. 
72 [32220,19700] at [2K,1K] in Case 6 and [22925,22925] at [2K,2K] in Case 10. 
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6.12 Overall Analysis of the Game Model 
In this section, we gather all the payoff matrixes of 10 cases and make them into one overall matrix. We 
try to find global equilibrium points in the uniform distribution. The following tables show the optimal 
response strategy set of IAP1 and IAP2. 
 
[Table 6-26] IAP1’s Optimal Strategy Set 
Transit-BE-Flat Transit-QoS-Flat Transit-QoS-2P Peering-BE-Flat Peering-QoS-Flat Peering-QoS-2P IAP2’s 
Strategy 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 
IAP1’s  
Optimal 
Strategy 
Set 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
 
[Table 6-27] IAP2’s Optimal Strategy Set 
Transit-BE-Flat Transit-QoS-Flat Transit-QoS-2P Peering-BE-Flat Peering-QoS-Flat Peering-QoS-2P IAP1’s 
Strategy 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 
IAP2’s  
Optimal 
Strategy 
Set 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Tran 
BE 
Flat 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K  
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
 
There are four shaded strategy sets in the above tables, which means there are four global equilibrium 
points in this game model. These four global equilibrium points are also equilibrium points in Cases 6, 7, 
9, and 10. Table 6-28 shows the global equilibrium points (shaded cells) among the local equilibrium 
points in each case. The cells with a letter ‘α’, ‘β’, ‘χ’, and ‘δ’ in table 6-29 are global equilibrium points 
considering all strategies. In the peering cases, there are three global equilibrium points and all of them 
are on a diagonal line. There is only one equilibrium point in the transit case: [2K, 1K] of the Case 6. The 
reason for more global equilibrium points in the peering case is that all transit cases have 9 options to be 
considered in determining an optimal strategy set but in the peering the number of options are three or six. 
For example, both BE-IAPs with peering have three options: {BE, flat-rate, peering, (1K/2K/3K)}, the 
same options in Case 7. So, the local equilibrium in Case 7 is always the global equilibrium. 
 
[Table 6-28] Equilibrium Profits 
 [1K, 2K] [2K, 1K] [2K, 2K] 
Case 1 [16993, 34013] [34013, 16993]  
Case 2 [16993, 40367]   
Case 3 [10500, 32220] [21020, 19700]  
Case 4 [11281, 32220] [23801, 19700]  
Case 5   [19265, 19265] 
Case 6 [19700, 32220] α: [32220, 19700]  
Case 7   β: [12800, 12800] 
Case 8   [14507, 22942] 
Case 9   χ: [22665, 22665] 
Case 10   δ: [22925, 22925] 
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[Table 6-29] Equilibrium Points in Uniform Distribution 
Transit Peering 
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6.13 Social Welfare Analysis 
According to Carlton and Perloff (1999, p71-72), one common measure of welfare from a market is the 
sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS). This measure of welfare is the value that 
consumers and producers would be willing to pay and to produce the equilibrium quantity of output at the 
equilibrium price. The CS is defined as the amount above price paid that a consumer would willingly 
spend, if necessary, to consume the units purchased. The PS is defined as revenues minus variable costs, 
or equivalently, profits plus the fixed costs. (Varian, 1999, p382) The variable cost is dependent on output 
while the fixed cost is independent on the output. In our model, the interconnection and capital costs are 
not dependent on the number of subscribers. Therefore, in the short-run we can assume the 
interconnection and capital costs are fixed and the operation cost is variable.  
 
For an explanation of calculating a social welfare, we take the equilibrium point at [2K, 2K] in Case 4 
(QoS-IAP1 with the flat-rate pricing and QoS-IAP2 with the two-part tariff), which is one of the 
complicated cases in the model. The followings are information used for the social welfare. 
 
[Table 6-30] Information for Social Welfare 
q1*BE q1*QoS P*BE f1* q1*BE+q2*BE q1*BE+q1*QoS FC1 hQoS 
1,158 525 $9.83 $11,107 2,231 1,683 $26,000 57 hrs 
q2*BE  q2*QoS P*QoS  f2* q1*QoS+q2*QoS q2*BE+q2*QoS FC2 r  
1,073 611 $48.47 $19,542 1,136 1,684 $26,000 $1.3 
  *FC: Fixed Cost 
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The CS in this case consists of (1) CS from BE and (2) CS from QoS. 
 (1) CS from BE 
The following equation is the BE demand function at [2K, 2K] in Case 4.  
• PBE = 50 – 0.01*QBE - 5*r = 43.5 – 0.01*QBE  
 
We need two prices for the calculation of CS from the BE consumption because QoS users have 
an influence on determining the BE price. The actual number of BE users are 3,367 (= 
q1*BE+q2*BE +q1*QoS+q2*QoS) including 2,231 BE only users. So, we need the following two 
prices: P*BE (QBE+QQoS=3367) = $9.83, and PBE (QBE=2231) = $21.19. The shaded area in figure 
6-3 shows the CS from the BE consumption. The triangle is calculated by ($43.5-
$21.19)*2231*0.5 and the rectangle part is calculated by ($21.19-$9.83)*2231. The sum of 
triangle and rectangle is the CS from the BE consumption, which equals $50,231. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 6-5] Consumer Surplus for BE 
(2) CS from QoS 
The following is the QoS demand function at [2K, 2K] in Case 4. 
• PQoS=P*BE + 50 – 0.01*QQoS = 9.83 + 50 – 0.01*QQoS = 59.83 – 0.01*QQoS    
 
In the case of QoS CS, we need to follow the definition of CS. Because an actual payment of the 
two-part tariff based on the usage hours can not be expressed in the two-dimension graph with 
fixed part of price (F) and quantity (Q), we calculate separately the total benefit and total 
payment from the QoS consumption, and then we calculate net benefit, i.e., (total benefit – total 
payment), as the CS from the QoS consumption. The total number of QoS users is 1,136 (=q1*QoS 
+ q2*QoS). The shaded area of the following figure shows the total benefit from the QoS 
$21.19 
$9.83 
    PBE 
$43.5 
2231  3367      QBE
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consumption, which is calculated by {($59.83-$48.47)*1136*0.5 + $48.47*1136} = $61,514. The 
total payment consists of (1) payment from the customer whose pricing is the flat-rate pricing (= 
q1QoS*pQoS = 525*$48.47 = $25,447) and (2) payment from the customers whose pricing is the 
two-part tariff (= q2QoS*(r*h+pBE) = 611*($1.3*57 + $9.83) = $51,281). Therefore, the CS from 
the QoS is -$15,214 (=61,514 – (25,447+51,281)). The total CS from both BE and QoS is 
$35,017 ( = $50,231-$15,214). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 6-6] Consumer Benefit for QoS 
 
The PS can be calculated by sum of profits (=30,649 = f1*+f2*) and sum of fixed costs (= 52,000 = 
FC1+FC2). In this case, the PS is $82,649 (= $30,649 + $52,000). Finally, the social welfare is $117,666 
(= CS + PC = $35,017 + $82,649). The following table is a summary of these calculations. The detailed 
numbers of social welfare of all cases are provided in Appendix F. 
 
[Table 6-31] Social Welfare at [2K, 2K] of Case 4 
CS PS Uniform 
Case 4 BE QoS Total Profits Fixed Cost Total 
SW 
[2K, 2K] 50,231 -15,214 35,017 30,649 52,000 82,624 117,666 
 
The following table shows points of the highest social welfare in the model, which is based on table F-1. 
There are 8 points whose social welfare values are $162, 730: [2K, 2K], [2K, 3K], [3K, 2K], and [3K, 
3K] of Case 5 and Case 9, which are higher than any other. This means that the strategy set of {QoS, flat-
rate, transit/peering, 2K/3K} is a socially desirable one. These points (Case 5 and 9) are different from the 
destination points of market equilibrium progressive paths (Case 6 and 9) and global equilibrium points of 
this model (Case 6, 7, 9, and 10), which suggests that market equilibrium does not mean socially desirable 
points. 
   PQoS 
$59.83 
$48.47 
1136                              QQoS
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[Table 6-32] The Highest SW Points 
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In section 6.12, we found multiple global equilibrium points (α, β, χ, and δ). An Internet policy maker, 
i.e., a government agency, has a responsibility to induce the Internet into a socially desirable point among 
them. According to the progressive market equilibrium paths, α (Case 6) and χ (Case 9) are plausible in 
the future QoS Internet. Through social welfare analysis we realize that χ is more desirable than α. The 
differences between χ and α are interconnection strategy and pricing scheme: α (Case 6) has transit 
interconnection strategy and two-part tariff and χ (Case 9) has peering interconnection strategy and flat-
rate pricing. Therefore, in the QoS Internet the government agency would have to encourage flat-rate 
pricing and peering: it can require IAPs to offer a flat-rate option to its customers, which has been the 
case in the U.S. telephone industry and it can drive the industry to make a peering arrangement. 
Currently, peering has been achieved among big IAPs and IBPs, but it is not popular between local small 
IAPs.  It is technically possible for QoS-IAPs to peer each other. However, it is also possible for them to 
remark and degrade the other’s traffic in their own network. In advance of the QoS-peering, each QoS-
IAP needs to trust that their traffic will be treated fairly and equally. From this perspective, one of the 
government’s roles is to help an ease of peering without distrust by establishing regulations and 
standards.  
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[CHAPTER 7] SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
In the previous chapter we use the theoretical uniform distribution for the customers’ willingness-to-pay. 
In this chapter, instead of the uniform distribution, we use an empirical distribution from a survey of 
Internet usage, on which we draw an estimated demand function by simulation and linear regression. We 
expect the empirical distribution to make the game model close to the real market situation. 
 
7.1 Demand Function Based on the Empirical Distribution 
In the U.S. GAO report (2001), there is a survey question: “About how much do you pay per month to 
access the Internet from your home?” Although this question does not provide an exact willingness-to-
pay for Internet access but we can use this answer as a proxy for customer’s demand. The following is the 
distribution from this question. 
 
[Table 7-1] Distribution of Household Expenditure for Internet Access (per Month) 
Sub-Range $0 ~$5 ~$10 ~$15 ~$20 ~$30 ~$40 ~$50 $50~ 
% 8.9 1.4 3.8 8.3 21.0 31.7 11.1 8.7 5.1 
            * Source: GAO-01-345, Characteristics and Choices of Internet Users, p46. 
 
We assume price range for BE is from $0 to $50, which is the same as in the uniform distribution and the 
data within a sub-range is uniformly distributed. We modified the above table into an equal sub-range: 
[$0-$10], [$10-$20], [$20-$30], [$30-$40], and [$40-$50]. The following is a modified piecewise uniform 
distribution table according to the above assumptions.  
 
[Table 7-2] Piecewise Uniform Distribution 
Sub-Range $0-$10 $10-$20 $20-$30 $30-$40 $40-$50 
% 14.1 29.3 31.7 11.1 13.8 
  
We use a two-stage RNG: (1) first, we use the above empirical distribution table (table 7-1) to match a 
sub-range and (2) then we use the piecewise uniform distribution (table 7-2) for a specific value. For 
example, if a random number (α) generated from the empirical distribution is between 0.0 and 0.141 (the 
1st sub-range), then this customer’s willingness-to-pay (β) is determined by a function of uniform [$0, 
$10]. Table 7-3 shows this two-stage RNG method. 
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[Table 7-3] Two-Stage RNG 
α = RNG-1 Sub-Range β = RNG-2 
0.0000 < α < 0.1410 $0 ~ $10 β = Uniform [$0,  $10] 
0.1411< α < 0.4340 $10 ~ $20 β = Uniform [$10, $20] 
0.4341< α < 0.7510 $20 ~ $30 β = Uniform [$20, $30] 
0.7511< α < 0.8620 $30 ~ $40 β = Uniform [$30, $40] 
0.8621< α < 1.0000 $40 ~ $50 β = Uniform [$40, $50] 
 
Based on these assumptions and methods, we conducted 30 times simulations and linear regressions, the 
results of which are presented in Appendix C. The estimated demand function for BE is presented in 
figure 7-1. The kinked line represents a demand curve from the simulation and the straight line represents 
a demand curve from the linear regression, which is “P = 44.55 – 0.00855*Q.” We estimate a QoS 
demand function by applying the product differentiation theory as we did in the uniform distribution case. 
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[Figure 7-1] Demand Curves for Empirical Distribution 
 
Based on this empirically estimated demand function, we analyze the 10 cases and the overall model as 
we did in the uniform distribution. We do not explain each case of empirical distribution in detail as we 
did in the uniform distribution. The detailed equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits at the equilibrium 
points of each case are presented in Appendix D and the payoff matrixes of 10 cases are provided in 
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Appendix E. The following table shows the basic demand functions of uniform and empirical 
distributions. 
[Table 7-4] Demand Function Comparison 
 Uniform Empirical 
BE PBE = 50 – 0.01*QBE PBE = 44.55 – 0.00855*QBE 
QoS PQoS = PBE + 50 - 0.01*QQoS PQoS = PBE + 44.55 - 0.00855*QQoS 
 
If we compare two demand functions, the demand function of uniform distribution has a higher intercept 
(50 > 44.55) and a steeper slope (0.01 > 0.00855) than that of empirical distribution. For the most of 
parts, the demand curve of the uniform distribution is above the demand curve of the empirical 
distribution. 
 
7.2 Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
The empirical distribution has the same equilibrium network capacity as in the uniform distribution 
except for Case 773. We try to find progressive market equilibrium paths from the equilibrium points of 
Case 1 as we did in the uniform distribution. There are identical, two progressive market equilibrium 
paths as in the uniform distribution. Tables 7-5a and 7-5b show these two paths. In conclusion, there is no 
significant difference in the results of equilibrium analyses between two distributions, thus uniform 
distribution assumption is reasonable in this game model.  
 
[Table 7-5a] Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
Transit Peering 
BE QoS BE QoS 
Flat Flat Two-Part Flat Flat Two-Part 
 
Empirical 
Distribution 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1          
2          
 
BE 
 
Flat 
3          
1          
2          
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3          
1          
2          
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3          
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2       
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3       
1       
2       
 
 
 
Peering  
 
QoS 
 
2-Part 
3 
 
 
      
 
                                                 
73 Case 7’s equilibrium network capacity: [2K, 2K] in the uniform distribution and [1K, 2K] and [2K, 1K] in the 
empirical distribution.  
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[Table 7-5b] Progressive Market Equilibrium Paths 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Path I Case 1 [1K, 2K] 
[15891, 31808] 
Case 2 [1K, 2K] 
[15891,35385] 
Case 5 [2K, 2K] 
[16101,16101] 
Case 9 [2K, 2K] 
[19501,19501] 
Path II Case 1 [2K, 1K] 
[31808, 15891] 
Case 3 [2K, 1K] 
[18815,18598] 
Case 6 [2K, 1K] 
[30015,18598] 
 
 
7.3 Overall Analysis of the Game Model 
In this section, we make all 10 payoff matrixes into one combined matrix and then try to find global 
equilibria in the game model. The following two tables show optimal strategy sets of IAP1 and IAP2 in 
the empirical distribution. 
 
[Table 7-6] IAP1’s Optimal Strategy Set 
Transit-BE-Flat Transit-QoS-Flat Transit-QoS-2P Peering-BE-Flat Peering-QoS-Flat Peering-QoS-2P IAP2’s 
Strategy 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 
IAP1’s  
Optimal 
Strategy 
Set 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
1K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
 
[Table 7-7] IAP2’s Optimal Strategy Set 
Transit-BE-Flat Transit-QoS-Flat Transit-QoS-2P Peering-BE-Flat Peering-QoS-Flat Peering-QoS-2P IAP1’s 
Strategy 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 1K 2K 3K 
IAP2’s  
Optimal 
Strategy 
Set 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
1K 
Tran 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
1K 
Peer 
BE 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
Flat 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
Peer 
QoS 
2P 
2K 
 
There are four global equilibrium points, ε, two φs, and γ in table 7-9, and two of them, ε ([2K, 1K] of 
Case 6) and γ ([2K, 2K] of Case 10), are the same positions as α and δ in the uniform distribution. These 
four global equilibria are also the local equilibrium points in Cases 6, 7, and 10. While in the result of 
uniform distribution QoS-IAPs could choose flat-rate or a two-part tariff in their global equilibrium 
points, in the empirical distribution QoS-IAPs could not choose flat-rate. Table 7-8 shows a collection of 
local equilibrium points in the empirical distribution and the shaded cells are the global equilibrium 
points.  
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[Table 7-8] Equilibrium Profits 
 [1K, 2K] [2K, 1K] [2K, 2K] 
Case 1 [15891,31808] [31808,15891]  
Case 2 [15891,35385]   
Case 3 [9730,30782] [18815,18598]  
Case 4 [8273,30015] [19690,18598]  
Case 5   [16101,16101] 
Case 6 [18598,30015] ε: [30015,18598]  
Case 7 φ: [11591,28508] φ:[28508,11591]  
Case 8   [10640,20965] 
Case 9   [19501,19501] 
Case 10   γ: [20965,20965] 
 
[Table 7-9] Equilibrium Points in Empirical Distribution 
Transit Peering 
BE QoS BE QoS 
Flat Flat Two-Part Flat Flat Two-Part 
 
Empirical 
Distribution 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
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7.4 Social Welfare Analysis 
We calculate social welfares of all 90 equilibrium points (= 9 cells * 10 cases) in the empirical 
distribution as we did in the uniform distribution. The detailed numbers are presented at table F-2 in 
Appendix F. The following table shows the highest social welfare in the empirical distribution. This point 
is [1K, 3K] in Case 2 (=$147,936), which is not a local equilibrium in Case 2 and which is different from 
the highest social welfare points in the uniform distribution. When we compare social welfares of [2K, 
2K] in Case 5 (one of the highest social welfare points in the uniform distribution) between table F-1 
(uniform) and table F-2 (empirical) in Appendix F, there is a big difference in the BE consumer surplus 
(66,390 vs. 39,145). But there is a small difference of BE consumer surplus at [1K, 3K] in Case 2 (the 
highest social welfare in the empirical distribution) in both distributions (53,999 vs. 51,400). The reason 
for different points of highest social welfares in the two distributions mainly comes from the level of 
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difference in the BE consumer surplus by using different estimated demand functions. However, if we 
consider only local equilibrium of each case, the highest social welfares are [2K, 2K] of Case 5 and Case 
9 (=$127,386), which are the same points as in the uniform distribution. 
 
[Table 7-10] Highest Social Welfare Points 
Transit Peering 
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If we try to compare the social welfares at the global equilibrium points from the two distributions, social 
welfares of uniform distribution are higher than those of empirical distribution. The reason for higher 
social welfare in the uniform distribution comes from the fact that the demand functions of empirical 
distribution are below those of uniform distribution, which causes lower consumer surplus, lower profits, 
and finally lower social welfare. The following two tables display the social welfare values of the global 
equilibrium points in both distributions. In the both distributions, social welfares of peering equilibrium 
points (β, χ, δ, φ, and γ) are higher than those of transit equilibrium points (α and ε), which means that 
peering is socially more desirable than transit. But comparing the combined profit of both IAPs at these 
global equilibrium points, the profit of transit is higher than that of peering, which is another obstacle to 
peer each other. 
  
[Table 7-11] Social Welfare of Global Equilibrium in the Uniform Distribution 
CS PS Uniform 
Distribution BE QoS Total Profits Fixed Cost Total 
SW 
α Case 6  [2K,1K] 38806 -14725 24081 51920 44000 95920 120,001 
β Case 7 [2K,2K] 72200 N/A 72200 25600 46600 72200 144,400 
χ Case 9 [2K,2K] 66390 5810 72200 45330 45200 90530 162,730 
δ Case 10 [2K,2K] 49251 -14725 34526 45850 45200 91050 125,576 
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[Table 7-12] Social Welfare of Global Equilibrium in the Empirical Distribution 
CS PS Empirical 
Distribution BE QoS Total Profits Fixed Cost Total 
SW 
ε Case 6 [2K,1K] 32040 -18055 13985 48613 44000 92613 106,598 
φ Case 7  
[1K,2K], [2K,1K] 
38424 N/A 38424 40099 37600 77699 116,123 
γ Case 10 [2K,2K] 46405 -18055 28350 41930 45200 87130 115,480 
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[CHAPTER 8] CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Answers for Research Hypotheses 
We have five research hypotheses in the section 1.4. Based on the 10 equilibrium results of each 
distribution, we can accept or reject these five hypotheses. 
 
(H1) An IAP with BE technology has the same profit in market equilibrium as another IAP with the same 
technology. 
• This hypothesis is related with Case 1 and Case 7. The following table shows the equilibrium 
profits in Case 1 and Case 7. 
 
[Table 8-1] Equilibrium Profits of Case 1 and Case 7 
 Uniform Distribution H1 Empirical Distribution H1 
Case 1 (1K, 2K) = [16993, 34013] 
(2K, 1K) = [34013, 16993] 
F 
 
(1K, 2K) = [15891, 31808] 
(2K, 1K) = [31808, 15891] 
F 
 
Case 7 (2K, 2K) = [12800, 12800] T (1K, 2K) = [11591, 28508] 
(2K, 1K) = [28508, 11591] 
F 
 
  
• According to the above table, when the network capacities of both IAPs are different, i.e., (1K, 
2K) or (2K, 1K), a profit of the larger IAP is higher than that of the smaller IAP. The H1 is only 
true when the capacities of both IAPs are the same. 
• Therefore, we reject H1. This implies that the same technology does not guarantee the same 
profit.  
• However, in Case 1 and Case 7, every strategy of both IAPs is the same except for the 
asymmetric investment in network capacity. If we gradually reduce the number of users for one 
set of equipment and T1 lines from 1000 to 500, 300, 200, and 100, the network capacity of 
equilibrium asymptotically converge equally, which leads to the symmetric equilibrium strategies 
of both IAPs and the equal equilibrium profits. This means that the asymmetric outcome is an 
artifact of the lumpiness of investment and the relatively small market size of the rural market. 
  
 (H2) An IAP with QoS technology and usage sensitive QoS pricing has a higher profit in market 
equilibrium than an IAP with QoS technology and flat rate QoS pricing.  
• This hypothesis is related with Case 4 and Case 8, where the IAP1 chooses the flat rate pricing 
and the IAP2 chooses the two-part tariff. The following table shows the equilibrium profits in 
Case 4 and Case 8.   
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[Table 8-2] Equilibrium Profits of Case 4 and Case 8 
 Uniform Distribution H2 Empirical Distribution H2 
Case 4 (1K, 2K) = [11281,32220] 
(1K, 2K) = [23801,19700]
F (1K, 2K) = [8273,30015] 
(1K, 2K) = [19690,18598] 
F 
Case 8 (2K, 2K) = [14507,22942] T (2K, 2K) = [10640,20965] T 
 
• According to the above table, when the network capacities of both IAPs are the same, the IAP 
with the two-part tariff has a higher profit than the IAP with the flat-rate pricing. But when the 
network capacities are different, the larger has a higher profit than the smaller regardless of 
pricing scheme. Therefore we reject H2. 
 
(H3) An IAP with BE technology and flat-rate pricing has a lower profit in market equilibrium than an 
IAP with QoS technology and flat-rate QoS pricing. 
• This hypothesis is related with Case 2. The following table shows the equilibrium profits of the 
Case 2. 
[Table 8-3] Equilibrium Profits of Case 2 
 Uniform Distribution H3 Empirical Distribution H3 
Case 2 (1K, 2K) = [16993, 40367] T (1K, 2K) = [15891, 35385] T 
 
• In the Case 2, QoS-IAP is larger and it has a higher profit in the both distributions. Therefore we 
accept H3. 
 
(H4) An IAP with QoS technology with usage-sensitive QoS pricing has a higher profit in market 
equilibrium than an IAP with BE technology and flat-rate pricing. 
• This hypothesis is related with Case 3. The following table shows the equilibrium profits. 
 
[Table 8-4] Equilibrium Profits of Case 3 
 Uniform Distribution H4 Empirical Distribution H4 
Case 3 [1K, 2K] = (10500, 32220) 
[2K, 1K] = (21020, 19700)
F [1K, 2K] = (9730, 30782) 
[2K, 1K] = (18815, 18598) 
F 
 
• Even a BE-IAP, if it has a larger network capacity at equilibrium, has a higher profit than a QoS-
IAP with the two-part tariff. Therefore, we reject H4. 
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(H5) Both IAPs with QoS technology give a higher social welfare than any other cases. 
• According to tables 7-11 and 7-12 (social welfare of global equilibrium in both distributions), the 
points β and φ are related to BE technology and the other points α, χ, δ, ε, and γ, are related to 
QoS technology. The social welfares of β and φ are the second highest in each distribution 
respectively. 
• Thus, the social welfare values of QoS technology are not always higher than those of BE 
technology. Therefore we reject H5, which means introducing QoS technology does not always 
means higher social welfare. 
 
Through testing the five research hypotheses, we conclude that there is no single dominant strategy to win 
in the Internet access market. Technology strategy alone or pricing strategy alone is not enough to 
dominate in the market. The winning strategy set is a combination of multiple strategies and it is different 
according to the other’s strategy set. The result of H5 gives an implication to non-rural networks: 
Introducing new technology does not always guarantee social welfare improvement. If cost of new 
technology is larger than benefit or if demand of new technology is not enough to cover the cost, it would 
make social welfare worse than before.   
 
8.2 Further Study  
There are some limitations in the QoS Internet game model. The followings should be considered in the 
future study: 
(1) IAPs’ access technology is confined to the narrowband Internet service. We need to expand our 
research to cover broadband service. If we introduce broadband technologies such as DSL, cable-
modem, or wireless technologies, we need to modify the cost structure of the game. Furthermore, 
whether IAPs start as a broadband provider or migrate from a narrowband provider, their cost 
structure also differs.   
(2) The assigning mechanism of the quality level is arbitrary. We assume the number of classes that a 
service can offer is the quality level of that service. (MBE = 1 and MQoS = 2) We need more logical 
method to assign the quality level of each service or we introduce the quality level (M) as a 
control variable in the profit function. 
(3) We only consider the Cournot game model. When a product is differentiated with various 
qualities, the Bertrand price competition may be the appropriate model to apply. 
(4) Price of two-part tariff QoS-IAP (= (PBE+r*hQoS)/user) is relatively high comparing that of flat 
rate QoS-IAP (= PQoS/user). Considering the current practice in the industry, we should consider 
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to give a certain mount of allowance (i.e., free QoS usage for the first 10 hours) to the two-part 
tariff QoS users. 
(5) We need to reconsider cost of QoS-IAP with the flat-rate pricing. QoS users with the flat-rate 
pricing will generate much more QoS traffic than QoS users with the two-part tariff. Therefore, 
QoS-IAP with the flat-rate pricing costs higher than QoS-IAP with the two-part tariff when they 
support the same number of QoS users. 
(6) In the local peering, even peering IAPs are usually dependent on an IBP for their outgoing traffic. 
So, it is reasonable for rural local IAPs to have a mixed interconnection strategy, i.e., local 
peering with local IAPs and transit with one or two IBPs.  
 
8.3 Conclusion 
The Internet has become an important social and business tool. The market has been quite dynamic since 
it was privatized. The Internet will evolve from our current situation but we don’t know what the future 
Internet will be. The one thing we do know is QoS will be introduced in the near future. By studying rural 
markets where the market structure is simpler, we are able to construct reasonable economic model for 
QoS Internet. In this dissertation, we show that the unique cost and revenue structure of the Internet 
access market has a significant influence on the equilibrium results.   
 
Internet technology has been developed and it impacts on the Internet market. The current Internet has 
flourished in the last three decades on the basis of BE technology and flat-rate pricing but it also has 
several problems in the areas of congestion, over-subscription, and interconnection. What will the future 
QoS Internet market be? The future IAPs might have more options for their strategic choices. Considering 
analyses in the dissertation, we can draw what the future Internet might be as follows: 
(1) QoS technology will be introduced with {two-part tariff, transit}, {two-part tariff, peering}, or 
{flat-rate, peering},    
(2) Network capacity is an important strategy to decide the market equilibrium in the future as well 
as in the current,  
(3) A peering arrangement will provide higher social welfare than transit will in the QoS Internet, 
and  
(4) A BE service will survive in the QoS Internet and will contribute a considerable portion to the 
IAPs’ revenue.   
 
Therefore, new technology (QoS) and larger capacity will pay off in the future Internet market. Even if 
you are not the first mover toward QoS, a second mover will pay off. 
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The analysis in this dissertation is based on the rural area. Is it possible to apply this analysis to urban 
areas? There are more IAPs in the urban area and competition is fiercer than in the rural area. But what 
we have learned from this dissertation can serve as a guideline to the urban Internet access market, too.  
 
What is a good strategy for a start-up IAP in the rural area? It depends on how much a new IAP has  
financial power and how much demand exists in that area. Without adequate fianacing, the start-up rural 
IAP has a limited choice of strategies, i.e., BE technology and 1K network capacity. According to table 2-
2 in the section 2.4, the average number paying dial-up users74 per local IAP (without top 10 dial-up 
IAPs) is roughly 800. That means those local IAPs may not have large enough subscriber base to 
accumulate money to invest in the network capacity and upgrading to QoS.  The 1K network capacity is 
enough to support 800 subscribers, thus we can say that [1K, 1K] in Case 1 might be a real situation in the 
rural Internet access market. At the equilibrium of  [1K, 1K] in Case 1, in all 90 equilibrium points, the 
sum of profits of IAP1 and IAP2 is relatively very high but the social welfare value of this point is 
relatively very low. Therefore, there is no incentive for additional investment to expand their business for 
more network capacity or upgrading their technology to QoS: minimum investment but relatively high 
profits.  
 
A policy maker’s goal for the Internet industry is continuing growth and innovation. To achieve this goal, 
they are trying to encourage competition and to give incentives for ongoing investment and deploying 
new technology, which will give benefit to consumers in the Internet market. Therefore, it is a role of 
Internet policy makers to induce the rural IAPs to move into the socially desirable equilibrium point in the 
future without market distortion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 {The number of paying dial-up users - Sum of top 10 dial-up IAP users} / {Number of IAPs in the downstream 
market} = (49.6 millions - 44.3 millions) / 7000 = 800 subscribers / IAP  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
A Summary of Peering Policies of UUNET and C&W 
 
[Table A-1] Example of Peering Policy 
 
Requirement UUNET75 C&W76 
Geographic Scope 50% of the geographic region of 
UUNET, 15 states in U.S., 8 
countries in Europe, and 2 countries 
in Aisa-Pacific Region 
Backbone node at the 9 geographic 
regions in which C&W also has 
nodes (3 in west coast, 2 in east 
coast, 4 in middle) 
Number of meeting 
place in the U.S. 
At least 4, one in East Coast, one in 
West Coast, and 2 in Midwest 
At least 4, East Coast, West Coast, 
Midwest, and South 
Backbone Capacity Nationwide redundant OC-12 Nationally deployed redundant OC-
48 
Traffic Exchange 
Ratio 
1.5: 1 2:1 
Traffic Volume At least 150 Mbps At least 45 Mbps 
NOC 24 hours x 7 days 24 hours x 7 days 
Measurement All traffic or sample, Peak 
Utilization 
Measuring in each direction 
(inbound and outbound) 
ETC Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement 
Shortest Exit Routing 
Providing Network information 
(map, topology, capacity). No 
Transit customer of C&W 
 
                                                 
75 www2.uu.net/peering 
76 www.cw.com 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Market Research for Broadband Internet Access Technology 
 
(1) According to the USGAO (United States General Accounting Office) report (2001), the conventional 
telephone line was still the most common method of transport to the Internet at 2000. The following 
is the distribution table for Internet access method from that report.  
 
[Table B-1]  Distribution of Internet Access Methods 
Access Methods Dial-up DSL Cable Modem Wireless 
Percent 87.5% 3.2% 8.9% 0.4% 
• Source: GAO-01-345, Characteristics and Choices of Internet Users 
 
(2) According to the Strategies Group, with an annual growth rate of 230%, the broadband market will 
surpass 36 million US household by 2005 (McClure, 2001), which means that until 2005 dial-up 
access technology will be dominant in the market.  
(3) A Department of Commerce study shows that 7.3% of rural subscribers use broadband compared to 
11.8% of urban subscribers (Bright, 2000), which means that rural areas have a higher dependency on 
the dial-up Internet access than urban areas. 
(4) According to the report from the joint team of NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration) and RUS (Rural Utility Services) (2000), many broadband companies concentrate on 
large cities and well populated towns, and rural towns (under 25,000 population) do not have a 
broadband service. The following tables, which come from the above report, show the deployment of 
cable modem service and RBOC’s DSL service across cities and towns of various sizes. Our 
concerned town size in this paper is below 25,000 populations. 
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[Table B-2] Broadband Cable Access by Town Size 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
         * Source: Cable Modem Deployment Update, CED Magazine (March 2000) 
 
[Table B-3] RBOC Provided DSL by Town Size 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
              * Source: Public Data from RBOCs (March 2000) 
 
(5) By the end of 2001, only about one in every ten U.S. households will have broadband -mainly 
provided by either DSL technology or by cable. (Grassman, 2001) 
Town Size 
(Urban) 
Over 
1M 
500K 
~1M 
250K 
~500K 
100K 
~250K 
50K 
~100K 
25K 
~50K 
% of Town 
Served 
100% of 
8 towns 
73.3% of 
15 towns 
65.9% of 
41 towns 
40.4% of 
136 
towns 
26.2% of 
355 
towns 
15.9% of 
742 towns 
Town Size 
(Rural) 
10K 
~25K 
5K 
~10K 
2.5K 
~5K 
1K 
~2.5K 
Under 1K  
% of Town 
Served 
7.6% of 
1852 
towns 
5.0% of 
2336 
towns 
2.0% of 
3022 
towns 
0.7% of 
4936 
towns 
0.2% of 
9993 
towns 
 
Town Size 
(Urban) 
Over 
1M 
500K 
~1M 
250K 
~500K 
100K 
~250K 
50K 
~100K 
25K 
~50K 
% of Town 
Served 
100% of 
8 towns 
73.3% of 
15 towns 
87.8% of 
41 towns 
56.6% of 
136 
towns 
32.1% of 
355 
towns 
17.0% of 
742 towns 
Town Size 
(Rural) 
10K 
~25K 
5K 
~10K 
2.5K 
~5K 
1K 
~2.5K 
Under 1K  
% of Town 
Served 
4.6% of 
1852 
towns 
1.4% of 
2336 
towns 
0.6% of 
3022 
towns 
0.1% of 
4936 
towns 
0.0% of 
9993 
towns 
 
 90 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Estimated BE Demand Curve by Simulation and Regression 
 
[Table C-1] Linear Regression Result by 30 Time Simulations 
 
BE Demand Simulation 
No. Constant Slope R2 
1 45.010 .00867 .974 
2 44.020 .00847 .969 
3 44.449 .00849 .970 
4 44.992 .00859 .972 
5 44.662 .00855 .972 
6 44.635 .00859 .971 
7 44.389 .00850 .971 
8 44.522 .00854 .971 
9 44.460 .00853 .971 
10 44.716 .00860 .972 
11 44.581 .00864 .974 
12 44.854 .00853 .970 
13 44.948 .00864 .974 
14 44.147 .00846 .968 
15 44.158 .00840 .967 
16 44.350 .00856 .968 
17 44.646 .00862 .971 
18 44.190 .00846 .969 
19 44.284 .00845 .970 
20 44.143 .00851 .969 
21 44.248 .00851 .969 
22 44.507 .00856 .971 
23 44.210 .00845 .967 
24 44.827 .00860 .971 
25 44.612 .00849 .970 
26 44.714 .00860 .971 
27 44.851 .00866 .976 
28 44.943 .00863 .974 
29 44.640 .00860 .969 
30 44.794 .00870 .971 
Mean 44.550 .00855  
95% CI for Mean LB=44.443 
UB=44.667 
LB=.00852 
UB=.00858 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Equilibrium Point of Empirical Distribution  
 
[Table D-1] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 1 
 
Case 1 q1*BE q2* BE f1* f2* P*BE 
[1K,1K] 999 999 24433 24433 27.47 
[1K,2K] 999 1999 15891 31808 18.92 
[1K,3K] 999 2515 11484 24086 14.51 
[2K,1K] 1999 999 31808 15891 18.92 
[2K,2K] 1999 1999 14717 14717 10.37 
[2K,3K] 1999 2015 14443 4719 10.23 
[3K,1K] 2515 999 24086 11484 14.51 
[3K,2K] 2015 1999 4719 14443 10.23 
[3K,3K] 2010 2010 4530 4530 10.18 
 
 
[Table D-2] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 2 
 
Case 2 q1* BE q2* BE q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P* BE P* QoS
[1K,1K] 999 429 570 999 999 24433 26010 27.47 67.14
[1K,2K] 999 1429 570 999 1999 15891 35385 18.92 58.59
[1K,3K] 999 1945 570 999 2515 11484 29663 14.51 54.18
[2K,1K] 1999 429 570 1999 999 31808 17468 18.92 58.59
[2K,2K] 1999 1429 570 1999 1999 14717 18294 10.37 50.04
[2K,3K] 1999 1445 570 1999 2015 14443 10296 10.23 49.91
[3K,1K] 2515 429 570 2515 999 24086 13061 14.51 54.18
[3K,2K] 2015 1429 570 2015 1999 4719 18020 10.23 49.91
[3K,3K] 2010 1440 570 2010 2010 4530 10107 10.18 49.86
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[Table D-3] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 3 
 
Case 3 r q1* BE q2* BE q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p* BE
[1K, 1K] 1.3 999 388 611 999 999 17939 27140 20.97
[1K, 2K] 1.5 999 1353 623 999 1976 9730 30782 12.75
[1K, 3K] 1.3 999 1524 611 999 2135 8236 22173 11.25
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1999 388 611 1999 999 18815 18598 12.42
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1756 1146 611 1756 1757 6364 17580 8.01
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1756 1146 611 1756 1757 6364 9580 8.01
[3K, 1K] 1.5 2077 376 623 2077 999 6867 17488 10.75
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1756 1146 611 1756 1757 -3636 17580 8.01
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1756 1146 611 1756 1757 -3636 9580 8.01
 
 
[Table D-4] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 4 
 
Case 4 r q1* BE q2* BE q1* QoS q2 *QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p* BE p* QoS
[1K, 1K] 1.3 533 388 466 611 999 999 16815 27240 20.97 56.31
[1K, 2K] 1.3 533 1388 466 611 999 1999 8273 30015 12.42 47.76
[1K, 3K] 1.3 533 1524 466 611 999 2135 7112 22173 11.25 46.6
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1533 388 466 611 1999 999 19690 18598 12.42 47.76
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 7240 9565 8.01 43.35
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 7240 9565 8.01 43.35
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1613 376 464 623 2077 999 9695 17488 10.75 46.01
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 -760 17565 8.01 43.35
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 -760 9565 8.01 43.35
 
 
[Table D-5] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 5 
 
Case 5 q1* BE q2* BE q1* QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* P* BE P* QoS
[1K,1K] 513 513 486 486 999 999 23817 23817 27.47 63.71
[1K,2K] 513 1513 486 486 999 1999 15276 33193 18.92 55.16
[1K,3K] 513 2029 486 486 999 2515 10868 27470 14.51 50.74
[2K,1K] 1513 513 486 486 1999 999 33193 15276 18.92 55.16
[2K,2K] 1513 1513 486 486 1999 1999 16101 16101 10.37 46.61
[2K,3K] 1513 1529 486 486 1999 2015 15828 8103 10.23 46.47
[3K,1K] 2029 513 486 486 2515 999 27470 10868 14.51 50.74
[3K,2K] 1529 1513 486 486 2015 1999 8103 7139 18.78 55.02
[3K,3K] 1523 1523 486 486 2009 2009 7931 7931 10.20 46.44
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[Table D-6] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 6 
 
Case 6 r q1* BE q2* BE q1* QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p* BE
[1K, 1K] 1.3 388 388 611 611 999 999 27140 27140 20.97
[1K, 2K] 1.3 388 1388 611 611 999 1999 18598 30015 12.42
[1K, 3K] 1.3 388 1524 611 611 999 2135 17436 22173 11.25
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1388 388 611 611 1999 999 30015 18598 12.42
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 17565 17565 8.01
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 17565 9565 8.01
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1454 376 623 623 2077 999 20623 17488 10.75
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 9565 17565 8.01
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 9565 9565 8.01
 
 
[Table D-7] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 7 
 
Case 7 q1* BE q2* BE f1* f2* P* BE 
[1K,1K] 999 999 20283 20283 27.47 
[1K,2K] 999 1999 11591 28508 18.92 
[1K,3K] 999 2515 7034 21636 14.51 
[2K,1K] 1999 999 28508 11591 18.92 
[2K,2K] 1999 1999 11417 11417 10.37 
[2K,3K] 1999 2015 10993 2269 10.23 
[3K,1K] 2515 999 21636 7034 14.51 
[3K,2K] 2015 1999 2269 10993 10.23 
[3K,3K] 2010 2010 2080 2080 10.18 
 
 
[Table D-8] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 8 
 
Case 8 r q1* BE q2* BE q1*QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p* BE p*QoS
[1K, 1K] 1.3 533 388 466 611 999 999 18515 28840 20.97 56.31
[1K, 2K] 1.3 533 1388 466 611 999 1999 9673 33415 12.42 47.76
[1K, 3K] 1.3 533 1524 466 611 999 2135 8212 27273 11.25 46.60
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1533 388 466 611 1999 999 23090 19998 12.42 47.76
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 10640 20965 8.01 43.35
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 10340 14665 8.01 43.35
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1613 376 464 623 2077 999 14795 18588 10.75 46.01
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 4340 20665 8.01 43.35
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1291 1146 466 611 1757 1757 4340 14665 8.01 43.35
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[Table D-9] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 9 
 
Case 9 q1*BE q2*BE q1*QoS q2*QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p *BE P* QoS
[1K,1K] 513 513 486 486 999 999 25517 25517 27.47 63.71
[1K,2K] 513 1513 486 486 999 1999 16676 36593 18.92 55.16
[1K,3K] 513 2029 486 486 999 2515 11968 32570 14.51 50.74
[2K,1K] 1513 513 486 486 1999 999 36593 16676 18.92 55.16
[2K,2K] 1513 1513 486 486 1999 1999 19501 19501 10.37 46.61
[2K,3K] 1513 1529 486 486 1999 2015 18928 13203 10.23 46.47
[3K,1K] 2029 513 486 486 2515 999 32570 11968 14.51 50.74
[3K,2K] 1529 1513 486 486 2015 1999 13203 18928 10.23 46.47
[3K,3K] 1523 1523 486 486 2009 2009 13031 13031 10.20 46.44
 
 
[Table D-10] Equilibrium Quantities, Prices, and Profits of Case 10 
 
Case 10 r q1* BE q2* BE q1* QoS q2* QoS Q1 Q2 f1* f2* p* BE
[1K, 1K] 1.3 388 388 611 611 999 999 28840 28840 20.97
[1K, 2K] 1.3 388 1388 611 611 999 1999 19998 33415 12.42
[1K, 3K] 1.3 388 1524 611 611 999 2135 18536 27273 11.25
[2K, 1K] 1.3 1388 388 611 611 1999 999 33415 19998 12.42
[2K, 2K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 20965 20965 8.01
[2K, 3K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 20665 14665 8.01
[3K, 1K] 1.5 1454 376 623 623 2077 999 25723 18588 10.75
[3K, 2K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 14665 20665 8.01
[3K, 3K] 1.3 1146 1146 611 611 1757 1757 14665 14665 8.01
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Payoff Matrixes of Empirical Distribution 
 
[Table E-1] Payoff Matrix of Case 1 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [24433, 24433] [15891, 31808] [11484, 24086] 2K 
2K [31808, 15891] [14717, 14717] [14443, 4719] 1K 
3K [24086, 11484] [4719, 14443] [4530, 4530] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K   
 
[Table E-2] Payoff Matrix of Case 2 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [24433, 26010] [15891, 35385] [11484, 29663] 2K 
2K [31808, 17468] [14717, 18294] [14443, 10296] 2K 
3K [24086, 13061] [ 4719,  18020] [4530, 10107] 2K  
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 2K   
 
[Table E-3] Payoff Matrix of Case 3 
IAP1         IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [17939,27140] [9730,30782] [8236,22173] 2K 
2K [18815,18598] [6364,17580] [6364,9580] 1K 
3K [6867,17488] [-3636,17580] [-3636,9580] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K   
 
[Table E-4] Payoff Matrix of Case 4 
IAP1         IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [16815,27240] [8273,30015] [7112,22173] 2K 
2K [19690,18598] [7240,17565] [7240,9565] 1K 
3K [9695,17488] [-760,17565] [-760,9565] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K   
 
[Table E-5] Payoff Matrix of Case 5 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [23817,23817] [15276,33193] [10868,27470] 2K 
2K [33193,15276] [16101,16101] [15828,8103] 2K 
3K [27470,10868] [8103,7139] [7931,7931] 1K 
Optimal  k1* 2K 2K 2K  
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[Table E-6] Payoff Matrix of Case 6 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [27140,27140] [18598,30015] [17436,22173] 2K 
2K [30015,18598] [17565,17565] [17565,9565] 1K 
3K [20623,17488] [9565,17565] [9565,9565] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 1K   
 
 
[Table E-7] Payoff Matrix of Case 7 
IAP1        IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [20283,20283] [11591,28508] [7034,21636] 2K 
2K [28508,11591] [11417,11417] [10993,2269] 1K 
3K [21636,7034] [2269,10993] [2080,2080] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 1K 2K  
 
 
[Table E-8] Payoff Matrix of Case 8 
IAP1          IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [18515,28840] [9673,33415] [8212,27273] 2K 
2K [23090,19998] [10640,20965] [10340,14665] 2K 
3K [14795,18588] [4340,20665] [4340,14665] 2K 
Optimal k1* 2K 2K 2K   
 
 
[Table E-9] Payoff Matrix of Case 9 
IAP1       IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [25517,25517] [[16676,36593] [11968,32570] 2K 
2K [36593,16676] [19501,19501] [18928,13203] 2K 
3K [32570,11968] [13203,18928] [13031,13031] 2K 
Optimal  k1* 2K 2K 2K  
 
 
[Table E-10] Payoff Matrix of Case 10 
IAP1       IAP2 1K 2K 3K Optimal k2* 
1K [28840,28840] [19998,33415] [18536,27273] 2K 
2K [33415,19998] [20965,20965] [20665,14665] 2K 
3K [25723,18588] [14665,20665] [14665,14665] 2K 
Optimal  k1* 2K 2K 2K   
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Welfare of the Internet QoS Game Model 
 
[Table F-1] Social Welfare of Uniform Distribution 
 
Uniform Dist.   CS     PS   SW 
CASE Capacity BE QoS Total Profits Fixed Total   
1(Transit) [1K,1K] 19960 0 19960 53966 20000 73966 93926 
(BE-BE) [1K,2K] 44940 0 44940 51006 30000 81006 125946 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 56079 0 56079 38735 40000 78735 134814 
  [2K,1K] 44940 0 44940 51006 30000 81006 125946 
  [2K,2K] 72200 0 72200 32200 40000 72200 144400 
  [2K,3K] 72200 0 72200 22200 50000 72200 144400 
  [3K,1K] 56079 0 56079 38735 40000 78735 134814 
  [3K,2K] 72200 0 72200 22200 50000 72200 144400 
  [3K,3K] 72200 0 72200 12200 60000 72200 144400 
2(Transit) [1K,1K] 17880 2080 19960 58320 28000 86320 106280 
(BE-QoS) [1K,2K] 42860 2080 44940 57360 36000 93360 138300 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 53999 2080 56079 47089 54000 101089 157168 
  [2K,1K] 42860 2080 44940 73360 38000 111360 156300 
  [2K,2K] 70120 2080 72200 38554 46000 84554 156754 
  [2K,3K] 70120 2080 72200 30554 54000 84554 156754 
  [3K,1K] 53999 2080 56079 43089 48000 91089 147168 
  [3K,2K] 70120 2080 72200 28554 56000 84554 156754 
  [3K,3K] 70120 2080 72200 20554 64000 84554 156754 
3(Transit) [1K,1K] 18093 -16592 1502 50180 28000 78180 79682 
(BE-QoS) [1K,2K] 43073 -16592 26482 42720 36000 78720 105202 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 43887 -16592 27295 34457 54000 88457 115752 
  [2K,1K] 43073 -16592 26482 40720 38000 78720 105202 
  [2K,2K] 54817 -16592 38225 27867 46000 73867 112092 
  [2K,3K] 54817 -16592 38225 19867 54000 73867 112092 
  [3K,1K] 42312 -17516 24797 28512 48000 76512 101309 
  [3K,2K] 54817 -16592 38225 17867 56000 73867 112092 
  [3K,3K] 54817 -16592 38225 9867 64000 73867 112092 
4(Transit) [1K,1K] 13508 -15214 -1706 50962 36000 86962 85256 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 38488 -15214 23274 43501 44000 87501 110775 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 39301 -15214 24087 35239 52000 87239 111326 
  [2K,1K] 38488 -15214 23274 43501 44000 87501 110775 
  [2K,2K] 50231 -15214 35017 30649 52000 82649 117666 
  [2K,3K] 50231 -15214 35017 22649 60000 82649 117666 
  [3K,1K] 37657 -16148 21509 33241 52000 85241 106750 
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  [3K,2K] 50231 -15214 35017 22649 60000 82649 117666 
  [3K,3K] 50231 -15214 35017 14649 68000 82649 117666 
5(Transit) [1K,1K] 14150 5810 19960 56296 36000 92296 112256 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 39130 5810 44940 55363 44000 99363 144303 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 50269 5810 56079 45065 52000 97065 153144 
  [2K,1K] 39130 5810 44940 55336 44000 99336 144276 
  [2K,2K] 66390 5810 72200 38530 52000 90530 162730 
  [2K,3K] 66390 5810 72200 30530 60000 90530 162730 
  [3K,1K] 50269 5810 56079 45065 52000 97065 153144 
  [3K,2K] 66390 5810 72200 30530 60000 90530 162730 
  [3K,3K] 66390 5810 72200 22530 68000 90530 162730 
6(Transit) [1K,1K] 13076 -14725 -1650 59380 36000 95380 93731 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 38806 -14725 24081 51920 44000 95920 120001 
(2P-2P) [1K,3K] 39639 -14725 24914 43657 52000 95657 120571 
  [2K,1K] 38806 -14725 24081 51920 44000 95920 120001 
  [2K,2K] 50860 -14725 36135 39050 52000 91050 127185 
  [2K,3K] 50860 -14725 36135 31050 60000 91050 127185 
  [3K,1K] 38652 -15575 23077 42268 52000 94268 117345 
  [3K,2K] 50860 -14725 36135 31050 60000 91050 127185 
  [3K,3K] 50860 -14725 36135 23050 68000 91050 127185 
7(Peering) [1K,1K] 19960 0 19960 45666 28300 73966 93926 
(BE-BE) [1K,2K] 44940 0 44940 43406 37600 81006 125946 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 56079 0 56079 31835 46900 78735 134814 
  [2K,1K] 44940 0 44940 43406 37600 81006 125946 
  [2K,2K] 72200 0 72200 25600 46600 72200 144400 
  [2K,3K] 72200 0 72200 16300 55900 72200 144400 
  [3K,1K] 56079 0 56079 31835 46900 78735 134814 
  [3K,2K] 72200 0 72200 16300 55900 72200 144400 
  [3K,3K] 72200 0 72200 7300 64900 72200 144400 
8(Peering) [1K,1K] 13508 -15214 -1706 54361 32600 86961 85255 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 38488 -15214 23274 48301 39200 87501 110775 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 39301 -15214 24087 41438 45800 87238 111325 
  [2K,1K] 38488 -15214 23274 48301 39200 87501 110775 
  [2K,2K] 50231 -15214 35017 37449 45200 82649 117666 
  [2K,3K] 50231 -15214 35017 30849 51800 82649 117666 
  [3K,1K] 37657 -16148 21509 39441 45800 85241 106750 
  [3K,2K] 50231 -15214 35017 30849 51800 82649 117666 
  [3K,3K] 50231 -15214 35017 24849 57800 82649 117666 
9(Peering) [1K,1K] 14150 5810 19960 59696 32600 92296 112256 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 39130 5810 44940 60136 39200 99336 144276 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 50269 5810 56079 51265 45800 97065 153144 
  [2K,1K] 39130 5810 44940 60136 39200 99336 144276 
  [2K,2K] 66390 5810 72200 45330 45200 90530 162730 
  [2K,3K] 66390 5810 72200 38730 51800 90530 162730 
  [3K,1K] 50269 5810 56079 51265 45800 97065 153144 
  [3K,2K] 66390 5810 72200 38730 51800 90530 162730 
  [3K,3K] 66390 5810 72200 32730 57800 90530 162730 
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10(Peering) [1K,1K] 12494 -14725 -2232 62780 32600 95380 93149 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 37474 -14725 22749 56720 39200 95920 118669 
(2P-2P) [1K,3K] 38287 -14725 23562 49857 45800 95657 119219 
  [2K,1K] 37474 -14725 22749 56720 39200 95920 118669 
  [2K,2K] 49251 -14725 34526 45850 45200 91050 125576 
  [2K,3K] 49251 -14725 34526 39250 51800 91050 125576 
  [3K,1K] 36491 -15575 20916 48468 45800 94268 115184 
  [3K,2K] 49251 -14725 34526 39250 51800 91050 125576 
  [3K,3K] 49251 -14725 34526 33250 57800 91050 125576 
 
  
[Table F-2] Social Welfare of Empirical Distribution 
 
Empirical Dist.   CS     PS   SW 
CASE Capacity BE QoS Total Profits Fixed Total   
1(Transit) [1K,1K] 17066 0 17066 48866 20000 68866 85932 
(BE-BE) [1K,2K] 38424 0 38424 47699 30000 77699 116123 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 52789 0 52789 35570 40000 75570 128359 
  [2K,1K] 38424 0 38424 47699 30000 77699 116123 
  [2K,2K] 68332 0 68332 29434 40000 69434 137766 
  [2K,3K] 68880 0 68880 19162 50000 69162 138042 
  [3K,1K] 52789 0 52789 35570 40000 75570 128359 
  [3K,2K] 68880 0 68880 19162 50000 69162 138042 
  [3K,3K] 69086 0 69086 9060 60000 69060 138146 
2(Transit) [1K,1K] 15677 1389 17066 50443 28000 78443 95509 
(BE-QoS) [1K,2K] 37035 1389 38424 51276 36000 87276 125700 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 51400 1389 52789 41147 54000 95147 147936 
  [2K,1K] 37035 1389 38424 49276 38000 87276 125700 
  [2K,2K] 66943 1389 68332 33011 46000 79011 147343 
  [2K,3K] 67491 1389 68880 24739 54000 78739 147619 
  [3K,1K] 51400 1389 52789 37147 48000 85147 137936 
  [3K,2K] 67491 1389 68880 22739 56000 78739 147619 
  [3K,3K] 67697 1389 69086 14637 64000 78637 147723 
3(Transit) [1K,1K] 15470 -19651 -4181 45079 28000 73079 68898 
(BE-QoS) [1K,2K] 36177 -20630 15548 40512 36000 76512 92060 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 40393 -19651 20742 30409 54000 84409 105151 
  [2K,1K] 36828 -19651 17177 37413 38000 75413 92590 
  [2K,2K] 51163 -19651 31512 23944 46000 69944 101456 
  [2K,3K] 51163 -19651 31512 15944 54000 69944 101456 
  [3K,1K] 38790 -20630 18160 24355 48000 72355 90515 
  [3K,2K] 51163 -19651 31512 13944 56000 69944 101456 
  [3K,3K] 51163 -19651 31512 5944 64000 69944 101456 
4(Transit) [1K,1K] 12107 -18723 -6616 44055 36000 80055 73439 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 33465 -18723 14742 38288 44000 82288 97030 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 37030 -18723 18308 29285 52000 81285 99593 
  [2K,1K] 33465 -18723 14742 38288 44000 82288 97030 
  [2K,2K] 47830 -18723 29107 16805 52000 68805 97912 
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  [2K,3K] 47830 -18723 29107 16805 60000 76805 105912 
  [3K,1K] 35398 -19709 15689 27183 52000 79183 94872 
  [3K,2K] 47830 -18723 29107 16805 60000 76805 105912 
  [3K,3K] 47830 -18723 29107 8805 68000 76805 105912 
5(Transit) [1K,1K] 4500 4039 8539 47634 36000 83634 92173 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 17547 4039 21586 48469 44000 92469 114055 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 27624 4039 31663 38338 52000 90338 122001 
  [2K,1K] 17547 4039 21586 48469 44000 92469 114055 
  [2K,2K] 39145 4039 43184 32202 52000 84202 127386 
  [2K,3K] 39560 4039 43599 23931 60000 83931 127530 
  [3K,1K] 27624 4039 31663 38338 52000 90338 122001 
  [3K,2K] 39560 4039 43599 15242 60000 75242 118841 
  [3K,3K] 39664 4039 43703 15862 68000 83862 127565 
6(Transit) [1K,1K] 10682 -18055 -7373 54280 36000 90280 82907 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 32040 -18055 13985 48613 44000 92613 106598 
(2P-2P) [1K,3K] 35605 -18055 17550 39609 52000 91609 109159 
  [2K,1K] 32040 -18055 13985 48613 44000 92613 106598 
  [2K,2K] 46405 -18055 28350 35130 52000 87130 115480 
  [2K,3K] 46405 -18055 28350 27130 60000 87130 115480 
  [3K,1K] 33812 -18970 14842 38111 52000 90111 104953 
  [3K,2K] 46405 -18055 28350 27130 60000 87130 115480 
  [3K,3K] 46405 -18055 28350 19130 68000 87130 115480 
7(Peering) [1K,1K] 17066 0 17066 40566 28300 68866 85932 
(BE-BE) [1K,2K] 38424 0 38424 40099 37600 77699 116123 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 52789 0 52789 28670 46900 75570 128359 
  [2K,1K] 38424 0 38424 40099 37600 77699 116123 
  [2K,2K] 68332 0 68332 22834 46600 69434 137766 
  [2K,3K] 68880 0 68880 13262 55900 69162 138042 
  [3K,1K] 52789 0 52789 28670 46900 75570 128359 
  [3K,2K] 68880 0 68880 13262 55900 69162 138042 
  [3K,3K] 69086 0 69086 4160 64900 69060 138146 
8(Peering) [1K,1K] 12107 -18723 -6616 47355 32600 79955 73339 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 33465 -18723 14742 43088 39200 82288 97030 
(F-2P) [1K,3K] 37030 -18723 18308 35485 45800 81285 99593 
  [2K,1K] 33465 -18723 14742 43088 39200 82288 97030 
  [2K,2K] 47830 -18723 29107 31605 45200 76805 105912 
  [2K,3K] 47830 -18723 29107 25005 51800 76805 105912 
  [3K,1K] 35398 -19709 15689 33383 45800 79183 94872 
  [3K,2K] 47830 -18723 29107 25005 51800 76805 105912 
  [3K,3K] 47830 -18723 29107 19005 57800 76805 105912 
9(Peering) [1K,1K] 4500 4039 8539 51034 32600 83634 92173 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 17547 4039 21586 53269 39200 92469 114055 
(F-F) [1K,3K] 27624 4039 31663 44538 45800 90338 122001 
  [2K,1K] 17547 4039 21586 53269 39200 92469 114055 
  [2K,2K] 39145 4039 43184 39002 45200 84202 127386 
  [2K,3K] 39560 4039 43599 32131 51800 83931 127530 
  [3K,1K] 27624 4039 31663 44538 45800 90338 122001 
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  [3K,2K] 39560 4039 43599 32131 51800 83931 127530 
  [3K,3K] 39664 4039 43703 26062 57800 83862 127565 
10(Peering) [1K,1K] 10682 -18055 -7373 57680 32600 90280 82907 
(QoS-QoS) [1K,2K] 32040 -18055 13985 53413 39200 92613 106598 
(2P-2P) [1K,3K] 35605 -18055 17550 45809 45800 91609 109159 
  [2K,1K] 32040 -18055 13985 53413 39200 92613 106598 
  [2K,2K] 46405 -18055 28350 41930 45200 87130 115480 
  [2K,3K] 46405 -18055 28350 35330 51800 87130 115480 
  [3K,1K] 33812 -18970 14842 44311 45800 90111 104953 
  [3K,2K] 46405 -18055 28350 35330 51800 87130 115480 
  [3K,3K] 46405 -18055 28350 29330 57800 87130 115480 
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